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Observations on the Implementation of the  
Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in  
Mali, Emanating from the Algiers Process



*This report presents the observations of The Carter Center as the Independent Observer of the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, emanating from the Algiers Process, for the period from May to August 2019.*

*The Carter Center: A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization, The Carter Center has helped to improve life for people in over 80 countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing diseases; and improving mental health care. The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former First Lady Rosalynn Carter, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide.*

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## ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY

ACRONYM*	DEFINITION
CN-DDR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
CMA	Coordination of Azawad Movements
CREMT	Medium-Term External Resources Framework
CSA	Monitoring Committee
CTS	Technical Security Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
FAMa	Armed Forces of Mali
FDD	Sustainable Development Fund
FDS	Malian security and defense forces
MAA	Arab Movement of Azawad



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In the period between May and August 2019, the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali was shaped largely by four factors. First, the resurgence of armed conflict between the signatory parties, namely clashes in May in Talataye and in July in Lerneb, broke the ceasefire in place since September 2017.<sup>2</sup> Second, the uncertainty about the future of the United Nations Mission in Mali contributed to the already slow pace of implementation. On June 28, the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 2480, extending the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) for one year and identifying 12 priority objectives to be achieved by June 2020. Third, the government reshuffle in April,





for the Independent Observer's recommendation to create a framework wherein critical, unresolved issues are brought directly before decision-makers in the government and the Movements. To date, this mechanism has not been created and is not among the priority priorities. Like the August 7 report of its sanctions committee, in Resolution 2480 (June 2019) the Security Council highlights the pressing need to accelerate implementation before the review of A/RES/68/59 in 2020.

**39 : 933 - :** The Independent Observer has noted significant divisions within the political class and civil society

MINUSMA identified three such individuals among the eligible combatants, while the government put forward a list of 28; the CMA, alleging a government attempt to remove its officers from the DDR process, objected to the government list. While

beneficiaries (many of whom may ultimately be denied eligibility) could mean that the tactical maneuvering that delayed

1 9037 : 7 39 2 9 . : 9- 37 . 3 ::9 09 2 9019 7  
.7 3 3 39 9 3 Also noteworthy is the lack of collaboration between the CMA and the  
government to identify and/or prosecute the actors responsible.

The protests in Kidal are a symptom of the



envisioned in Title IV. The completion of the work on the role of traditional authorities in the justice sector (Commitment 19 of the roadmap) likewise represents but one element of the justice system reform agreed to by the parties in Title V.

In short, the July 2019 roadmap, as agreed upon by the parties in Article 50 and echoed by the Security Council in Resolution 2423 (June 2018). Given the trend towards stalled implementation and growing skepticism about the agreement, the choice of limited objectives may jeopardize the prospects for lasting peace.

This observation is borne out by the fact that nearly half of the commitments in the July roadmap focus on preliminaries, such as the review or adoption of legislative and constitutional texts, the holding of consultations, or the development of action plans. Indeed, most of the obstacles that impeded the implementation of the March 2018 roadmap – which saw only four of its 21 commitments achieved within the specified timeframes – remain, particularly the absence of the budgetary and financial planning required to meet commitments.

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This section focuses on the factors and obstacles related to the implementation of Title IV of the agreement. It is not specific to the period between April and August 2019.

According to Article 35, Title IV, which covers socio-economic and cultural development, aims to assist the northern regions in reaching the same level of development as the rest of Mali. The core of Title IV is the establishment of a new institutional architecture to promote development, including a Northern Region Development Zone (Article 33) paired with a Specific Development Strategy (Article 34), both under the leadership of the new regional assemblies and the Interregional Advisory Board (Article 33). In addition, in Article 38 and Annex 3, the Malian parties committed to undertake specific steps to advance development in the short, medium, and long term.

In order to establish a baseline assessment of needs in early post-conflict recovery, poverty reduction, and development, and as context for the financing of the Specific Development Strategy, the agreement calls for two preliminary steps: a joint evaluation mission for northern Mali

The Northern Development Zone, which was to be created in 2015, was not created until July 2019. Similarly, the Specific Development Strategy is not operational because of disagreements between the Malian parties on the steering and management bodies of the FDD. The result is that the Malian people continue to complain about the lack of economic dividends from the agreement.

Among the main obstacles to the implementation of Title IV are:

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*Disagreements among the Parties and the Disappointment of the Population*

The fundraising conference held in Paris in 2015 resulted in pledges from AU and international partners of 2,120 billion FCFA (US\$3.6 billion) to support implementation, 397 billion FCFA (US\$672 million) of which was specifically designated for the northern regions. The government announced a parallel contribution of 300 billion FCFA (US\$508 million) for economic development between 2015 and 2018.

As the government noted at the July session of the CSA, and as other reports have indicated, the commitments of the international partners did not constitute new or additional funds created specifically to support the implementation of the agreement, but rather a global sum totaling general assistance from financial and technical partners (PTFs) for already-planned projects. Today, the general perception among the northern population is that few new, meaningful development projects have been implemented since the signing of the agreement.

In general, the international partners have kept their financial commitments. An October 2018 report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and African Integration found that, based on estimated current disbursements and forecasts of disbursements, 74% of the money allocated for the period between 2015 and 2017

Further, a number of documents from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, such as the report of Dec. 28, 2018, highlight the contribution of 311 billion FCFA (US\$526 million) from 2015 to 2018. But this figure intermingles spending on the politico-institutional, defense, and security components of the agreement with spending to advance development. Thus, regional and presidential elections costing 99 billion FCFA (US\$168 million) are classified as support for implementation of Title IV. as 40 billion FCFA (US\$68 million), when the government is in reality 16 billion FCFA (US\$27 million) to date. Based on these documents, the Independent Observer can only conclude that the government has failed to fulfill its commitment to provide 300 billion FCFA for the economic development of the north.



### 3. Sustainable Development Fund

Formally established in February 2018, the FDD is not operational and is another subject of disagreement between the Malian parties. They disagree on the composition of the management mechanisms and make-up of the steering committee; the dispute concerns even the content of the procedures manual. The Independent Observer has noted a real reluctance in some government departments, including the Ministry of Economy and Finance, to allow the Movements to participate in the management of the FDD. These departments generally believe that, as the Movements are slated to dissolve under the terms of the agreement, the management of the FDD lies strictly with government specialists. This approach stands in contrast with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2480 (June 2019), which prioritizes the inclusive management of the FDD, as well as with the commitment of the Minister of Social Cohesion, Peace, and National Reconciliation in the July roadmap to *allow the Movements to participate in the management of the FDD*. This approach may hamper functioning of the FDD.

The funding of the FDD is another source of disagreement. According to the July 13, 2017, speech of the Minister of Economy and Finance during a workshop with the Movements, the FDD was to be funded annually by the government based on a forecast



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The absence of

For the Malian people, the economic dividends of peace have been slim. The implementation of Title IV has been characterized by a lack of both political will and rigor. It has proven impossible for the Independent Observer to collect definitive information on the amounts spent for specific projects in specific, identified locations in the north. In addition, the principal institutions provided for in the agreement to support development in northern Mali are largely paralyzed by disagreements among the

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10. *That, with all due haste, the government, in collaboration with the interim*

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Based in Washington, D.C.

<sup>2</sup> In Talataye, the clashes were between the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad-Daoussak (MSA-D); in Lerneb, they were between a faction of the Arab Movement of Azawad-Plateforme (MAA-Plateform) and a faction of the Arab Movement of Azawad-CMA (MAA-CMA).

<sup>3</sup> Fundamental law on the creation, organization and management of the Northern Region Development Zone, June 27, 2019; Law on the National Understanding, June 27, 2019. Regarding the Northern Region Development Zone, see [VYck žÍ C Vgřfj Uřcbg'UbX'F Wta a YbXUřcbg'cb ħŸ' a d'Ya YbřUřcb'cZH\]hY' ÷ "Ī](#)

<sup>4</sup> See, the March 27, 2019, decree transferring national-level administrative services to the *collectivités territoriales*.

<sup>5</sup> It is notable that Gamu did not deny the attribution of the recording. In August, in another audio recording, Gamu voiced his support for DDR and the implementation of the agreement.

<sup>6</sup> Those conditions are the possession of an arm, membership in a self-defense militia, or to be a surrendering jihadist.

<sup>7</sup> According to the latest information collected by the Independent Observer, the figure is 63,000; however, MINUSMA has also cited the figure of 76,000 [\[ dfY-fY\[ \]ghřYXĪ 'Wta VUřbg'](#)

<sup>8</sup> The Independent Observer reiterates its previous observations and recommendations concerning the lack of a plan, binding timeframe, or predictable budget for the general DDR process, which lies at the heart of the agreement and is crucial for peace and stability in Mali. The Malian parties have yet to demonstrate a strong motivation to complete the general DDR process.

<sup>9</sup> (1) constitutional reform; (2) review the law on the code of *collectivités territoriales*; (3) transfer decentralized state services; (4) transfer 30% of government revenues to the north; (5) adopt legislation establishing a regional police force; (6) concepG((i02 Ti-3(the )-4(n)1 0 0901820 612 792 reW\* nBT/FTm330 g0 G(tion)-6( )-2(est)-12(ablis)-12(hin)-4(g )-5(a r)-3(eg)-4(ic