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“Retraso andino: donde lo lógico se hace insólito”

Marcela Sánchez

Latin American Herald Tribune

20 de agosto de 2010.

No me sorprende con frecuencia en este trabajo. Después de 17 años de cubrir Latinoamérica y a líderes como Alberto Fujimori, Daniel Ortega y Hugo Chávez, se llega a pensar que ya se ha visto todo.

Pero la semana pasada, cuando el presidente peruano, Alan García, me recibió en Lima para una entrevista, tengo que admitir que me dejó asombrada su franqueza y su vivo sentido de solidaridad con los vecinos de su país, dos rasgos poco frecuentes entre líderes actuales de la región andina.

Mándenlos la policía colombiana al Perú , exclamó al hablar acerca del narcotráfico y las dificultades de combatirlo en aislamiento. Mándenlos y que tomen el aeropuerto del Callao, agregó refiriéndose al terminal aéreo internacional más importante del país.

A juicio de García, la policía colombiana ha desarrollado un nivel de experiencia y sofisticación que no tiene igual en la región, en gran medida gracias al apoyo multimillonario de Washington.

Claro está que el líder peruano no está dispuesto a dejar la seguridad de su pueblo en manos de una fuerza extranjera. No obstante, García estaba haciendo dos importantes señalamientos: la región andina comparte este reto y Estados Unidos no es una amenaza, sino un gran aliado potencial.

Estos sentimientos se han desdibujado en tiempos recientes, en buena medida gracias al barullo de recriminaciones en la región.

Probablemente, una conversación similar sobre drogas y amenazas a la seguridad con otro líder andino habría incluido manifestaciones de sospecha hacia los colombianos, así como también hacia los estadounidenses, por sus presuntos deseos de violar la soberanía nacional.

En otras palabras, las tensiones más que la cooperación han llegado a definir las relaciones regionales. Por casi dos años, por ejemplo, los lazos diplomáticos entre Ecuador y Colombia se rompieron tras el ataque militar colombiano a un campamento de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) dentro de territorio ecuatoriano, en marzo de 2008.

Los vínculos entre Venezuela y Colombia en los últimos dos años han sido peor aún. Se han retirado embajadores, el comercio se ha congelado, ha habido amenazas de guerra y las relaciones diplomáticas se han roto. Todo esto por diferencias en temas de seguridad como el ataque a Ecuador, la presencia militar estadounidense en Colombia y las acusaciones de que Venezuela alberga a guerrilleros de las FARC en su territorio.

Durante nuestra entrevista, hecha posible por una iniciativa del Centro Carter que busca generar mayor entendimiento entre las naciones andinas y Estados Unidos, García lamentó que Perú no

A García le gusta recordar los esfuerzos que hizo, durante su primer mandato presidencial, por conseguir que Estados Unidos reconociera su responsabilidad en la desestabilización que genera el narcotráfico en la región. En 1990 en Cartagena, Colombia, García presionó al entonces presidente George H. Bush para que complementara con recursos la manifiesta voluntad de Washington de apoyar a la región en esta lucha. ¿Dónde está la carne? , recordó haberle preguntado García a Bush padre.

Diez años más tarde, Estados Unidos aprobó un paquete multimillonario de ayuda al Plan Colombia. Prácticamente, a Perú se le ignoró, ya que estaba menos preocupado por el narcotráfico que por el fin de la saga de Fujimori.

Ahora, en su segundo gobierno, Gar

“Obama and the Americas: Promise, Disappointment, Opportunity”

Abraham F. Lowenthal

Foreign Affairs

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Incoming U.S. presidents, from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush, have often announced a new policy initiative toward Latin America and the Caribbean. But few expected this from Barack Obama. His administration was inheriting too many far more pressing problems. During the presidential campaign, moreover, he had said little about the region beyond suggesting that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) be renegotiated and expressing vague reservations about the pending free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama.

Soon after Obama's inauguration, however, the administration organized high-level visits to Latin America and the Caribbean and announced various initiatives toward the region. Calling for a "new beginning" in U.S.-Cuban relations, it loosened restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba by Cuban Americans, said it would consider allowing U.S. investment in telecommunications networks with the island, and expressed a willingness to discuss resuming direct mail service to Cuba and to renew bilateral consultations on immigration to the United States. The administration also backed away from Obama's earlier comments about the free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. In April 2009, the president announced that he would press for comprehensive immigration reform, a move that was welcomed throughout the region. He also won praise for his consultative manner and his interest in multilateral cooperation at the Fifth Summit of the Americas, in Trinidad and Tobago in April 2009.

In addition to the White House's preexisting commitment to attend the summit in Trinidad and Tobago, there were two main reasons for the Obama administration's surprising early attention to the Americas. One was the hope that it could score a quick foreign policy victory: people in the region had widely rejected George W. Bush's policies, but more because of style -- a combination of neglect and arrogance -- than because of any deep, substantive conflict. Obama aimed to do better.

Second, and more important, was the new administration's perception that although the countries of the region posed no urgent issues for the United States, some of them were increasingly important to its day-to-day concerns. Mexico drew U.S. policymakers' attention early on with a surge in homicides and in confrontations between its government and its narcotics cartels, as well as an abrupt economic downturn, a consequence of the U.S. economic crisis that was then exacerbated by an outbreak of the H1N1 virus. Washington faced a choice: try to quarantine Mexico, a neighbor with a population nearing 110 million and a shared border some 2,000 miles long, in order to insulate the United States from its problems or fashion a more effective partnership to help Mexico deal with those problems and mitigate their implications for the United States. The administration moved promptly to focus on working with Mexico. Mexico's

crisis, moreover, had illuminated the increasing everyday importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States, especially that of its closest neighbors in the region.

A POSITIVE VISION

In preparing for the summit in Trinidad and Tobago, the Obama administration assessed the legacy of recent U.S. policies. Administrations of both parties had emphasized regionwide summits, but these had produced little besides rhetoric and an occasional new process of consultation. After 9/11, Washington mainly viewed the region through the prism of international terrorism -- and therefore mostly as a low priority -- instead of focusing on the issues that were, and still are, the most important to people there: poverty, education, income distribution, and citizens' security from street and gang violence and organized crime.

Many in Latin America and the Caribbean felt that a Cold War mentality lingered in Washington. They opposed some policies of the Bush years, including the invasion of Iraq and an ideological insistence on the benefits of the "Washington consensus." Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, bent on restructuring the international system in favor of the Global South, took advantage of this sentiment by stepping up his flamboyant anti-American rhetoric. He also sought influence by subsidizing gasoline prices and offering other significant economic assistance throughout the region.

The challenge to U.S. leadership in the Americas was not limited to Venezuela and its Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (an organization that includes Bolivia, Ecuador, and five Central American and Caribbean states). Many other Latin American and Caribbean countries began deepening subregional integration, partly through new formal institutions, such as the Union of South American Nations and the South American Defense Council, but mostly through growing regional trade and investment, multinational corporations, and business networks.

As the self-confidence of Latin American and Caribbean nations has grown, support for Pan-American approaches to the region's problems has waned. The Organization of American States has often been ineffectual, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which is intended to strengthen democratic institutions in OAS member countries, has produced few meaningful results. The influence of the Inter-American Development Bank has also weakened in recent years, as liquidity in private international capital markets has increased and both the Andean Development Corporation and Brazil's National Bank for Economic and Social Development have gained importance.

Several countries -- notably Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela -- have been vigorously building ties beyond the Americas, with countries of the European Union, the Asia-Pacific

the Middle East and with Iran. As actors outside the Americas have become more important to Latin American and Caribbean countries, Washington's influence has declined perceptibly.

In late 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seemed to dash hopes that the United States would drop its hegemonic attitude when she warned Latin American and Caribbean governments that might be tempted to "flirt with Iran" to "take a look at what the consequences might be." Even Latin Americans wary of Iran were rankled. Obama's welcome call for a new approach to Cuba produced little change. After reversing some sanctions imposed by the Bush administration, the Obama government indicated that Cuba would have to make the next move before Washington considered any more steps toward rapprochement. Far from ushering in a new beginning, the Obama administration seemed to revert to the stance of several previous U.S. administrations: it would wait for Cuba to change.

Obama's promise to prioritize comprehensive immigration reform gave way to a more limited commitment to begin consultations soon -- and even that modest goal then receded. And after the

ease the country's divisions. No Latin American government presented a practical alternative to the U.S. approach, but many nonetheless criticized it on the grounds that Washington's behavior had weakened the hard-won norm against condoning military coups in the region.

In August 2009, the Obama administration mishandled its communications with South American nations about a new ten-year defense cooperation agreement it had negotiated with Colombia. The plan would give U.S. military personnel in the country (capped at 1,400, as before) access to seven Colombian military bases. When news of the accord was leaked in advance of an official statement, Brazil and several other South American governments expressed concern, and some called for full disclosure of the deal's provisions and formal guarantees that U.S. military activities would be restricted to Colombian territory. Worry subsided when the U.S. and Colombian governments provided additional details and, earlier this year, Brazil reached its own security cooperation agreement with the United States. Still, the incident undercut the Obama administration's stated commitment to consultation and transparency

CONFLICTING CONCERNS

It is much too early to know how the Obama administration's policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean will develop or how U.S. relations with the region's diverse countries and subregions will ultimately evolve. This is partly because U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean is shaped less by strategic considerations than by the continuous interplay of various domestic pressure groups in a policy process that is open to so many external influences. On issues other than imminent threats to national security, it is often easier for various groups in the United States to influence U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean than it is for the U.S. government to coordinate or control it.

This tendency has been reinforced in recent years by the proliferation of U.S. government agencies involved in inter-American affairs. The Departments of State and Defense and the CIA no longer monopolize U.S.-Latin American relations, as they did from the 1940s through the 1970s. Today, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Drug Enforcement Administration also have considerable influence in many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Congress, with its various committees and caucuses, is more relevant than the executive branch on many issues, including immigration, narcotics, and trade. Even state and local governments have a say -- as was illustrated this spring, when Arizona passed a law

for its ambitious health-care plan and for a bill to stimulate job creation. Lobbying from agricultural groups in the Midwest ensured that both the subsidies for U.S. cotton and ethanol producers and the tariffs on ethanol from Brazil would be maintained. The clumsy handling of the Colombian bases agreement partly reflected a power imbalance between the Pentagon and the State Department, thanks to blocks in the Senate on nominations for top posts in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. And Washington's ambivalent policy on Honduras was influenced by the anti-Zelaya lobby in the United States, which seemed motivated more by an eagerness to weaken Chávez and embarrass Obama than by any concern for Honduras itself.

fundamental human rights; and supporting efforts by Latin American and Caribbean governments to strengthen their effective democratic governance.

Obama's positive but never fully articulated vision for Latin America and the Caribbean can still

The catastrophic earthquakes that struck Haiti and Chile early this year were dramatic reminders that policies must often respond to the unexpected. The Obama administration quickly demonstrated its solidarity with the victims of the disasters by emphasizing multilateral cooperation in its participation in relief efforts. In Haiti, it worked with Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ec360((nist)-o60v-99(E6(Veor)n(e)4(d)5(il)u(d)la-99(E)4(it)nd99(Ec3o(th)-5(s)-37010

and the rule of law. In an international environment that is often hostile to the United States, the Americas remain a largely congenial neighborhood.

For all these reasons, the Obama administration should reinvest in its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. To do so, it should certainly help strengthen the Inter-American Development Bank, which has become more relevant in the wake of the international financial crisis and in these days of tight credit, and the OAS and other institutions that can take on select regional challenges on which there is broad consensus. But the administration should explicitly recognize that overarching Pan-American partnerships are less relevant today than cooperation with individual countries or clusters of countries on specific issues.

For example, Washington should explicitly recognize that U.S. relations with Mexico are unique because of the high degree of functional integration between the two societies and economies. Developing new concepts, policies, modes of governance, norms, and institutions in both countries to deal with this unprecedented integration should become a strategic priority. The United States should also invite Mexico and Canada to engage with the United States over the long term to assist in the development of the countries of Central America and the Caribbean with which they have strong demographic and economic ties and overlapping security, public health, environmental, and humanitarian concerns.

The administration should also work closely with Brazil to reform and reinforce international trade, finance, and investment rules; combat climate change; prevent and contain global pandemics; curb nuclear proliferation; and strengthen international governance arrangements. It is natural that these two large and complex countries with such different global positions and different domestic political exigencies will not see eye to eye on every question. But it should be a concern of high priority to negotiate and compromise on matters on which the interests of the two countries are compatible.

“América Latina en la Política Exterior de los EE.UU: Políticas, Prioridades e Intereses Cambiantes”

Abraham Lowenthal

Plataforma Democrática

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Resumen

La importancia de los países latinoamericanos y el Caribe en la política exterior de los Estados Unidos ha cambiado más en los últimos años que los conceptos usados por los analistas y el lenguaje que frecuentemente usan los diseñadores de estas políticas.

Desde fines del siglo XIX hasta las últimas décadas del XX, las autoridades gubernamentales de los EE.UU. (en documentos secretos y en declaraciones públicas), así como expertos externos, generalmente afirmaban que los países latinoamericanos y el Caribe eran importantes en la política exterior de los EE.UU. debido: a la seguridad militar, a la solidaridad política, y al beneficio económico, definido entonces fundamentalmente en términos de las importaciones norteamericanas de material primas y productos agrícolas de América Latina y de las inversiones de los Estados Unidos en la región.

Los tres motivos de la supuesta importancia de Latinoamérica para los Estados Unidos declinaron de manera constante desde mediados del siglo XX hasta los años '90. Las revoluciones en la tecnología militar y el comercio marítimo, disminuyeron la importancia estratégica de Latinoamérica para los EE.UU., incluyendo la del Canal de Panamá. También declinó considerablemente, a partir de los '70 y los '80, su tradicional valor diplomático, cuando muchos países latinoamericanos expresaron cada vez más su solidaridad con el Tercer Mundo, en lugar de hacerlo con los EE.UU., persiguiendo sus intereses independientemente, y de este modo la importancia económica relativa de Latinoamérica para los EE.UU. declinó a lo largo de varios años, si bien ha repuntado algo desde mediados de los '90. Unos pocos países latinoamericanos, especialmente México, continúan siendo importantes para la economía norteamericana, fundamentalmente como mercados, pero su importancia global para la economía norteamericana contemporánea, es menor que la de Asia, Medio Oriente o Europa.

Pero los países latinoamericanos - especialmente los vecinos más cercanos a los EE.UU. en México, América Central, y el Caribe, así como el país más grande y más influyente de la región, Brasil - son cada vez más importantes para los Estados Unidos y su futuro en términos del día a día.

En primer lugar, hay un muy alto y creciente grado de interdependencia demográfica y económica entre los Estados Unidos y sus vecinos más cercanos. Las cuestiones más destacadas en las relaciones de los EE.UU. con sus vecinos más cercanos, ya no son las clásicas cuestiones de política exterior y relaciones internacionales formuladas de la manera tradicional, sino más bien, son temas intermésticos – combinando características y facetas nacionales e internacionales.

de dejar establecido que quiere ser tomada en cuenta en los escenarios internacionales (especialmente respect a otros asuntos), que con la presentación de cualquier desafío directo a los EE.UU. o a sus intereses en el Hemisferio Occidental. Los esfuerzos iraníes por estrechar relaciones con Venezuela, Brasil; Bolivia, Argentina y potencialmente otros países, es la única preocupación significativa actual extra hemisférica de la política norteamericana, fundamentalmente porque Irán y los EE.UU. aparentan estar en una claro curso de colisión.

Los países de América Latina y el Caribe se han estado moviendo en direcciones muy diferentes, y por lo tanto, plantean desafíos muy distintos a la política norteamericana. Hoy se destacan diferentes modelos de relación U.S.A. – América Latina: aquel con los vecinos más cercanos de los EE.UU. en México, América Central y el Caribe; con Brasil, el país más grande y poderoso de la región, surgiendo como un poder mundial; con los países del Cono Sur; y con los países de la Alternativa Bolivariana , principalmente de la región de los Andes, que difieren entre si, pero están todos signados por grandes desigualdades, pobreza extrema, y polarización social y étnica.

Hay quienes dentro de la comunidad política norteamericana, así como en México, América Central y el Caribe, están comenzando a comprender la necesidad de desabrey

El significado de los países latinoamericanos y el Caribe para la política exterior de los Estados Unidos ha cambiado en los últimos años, más que los conceptos que usan los analistas y el lenguaje que frecuentemente emplean los diseñadores de estas políticas. El desarrollo de políticas eficaces por parte de EE.UU. para América Latina y el Caribe depende en parte de la mejor comprensión de los desafíos, amenazas y oportunidades que América Latina representa para los EE.UU., ahora y en un futuro previsible. Este ensayo se refiere a la evolución de las realidades latinoamericanas relacionadas con los intereses y prioridades actuales y emergentes de los EE.UU. en un cambiante contexto mundial.

Conceptos Tradicionales

Desde fines del siglo XIX hasta las últimas décadas del XX, las autoridades gubernamentales de los EE.UU. (en documentos secretos y en declaraciones públicas), así como también expertos externos, coincidían generalmente en afirmar que los países latinoamericanos y del Caribe eran importantes en la política exterior de los EE.UU. Se decía que las razones por las cuales Latinoamérica era importante para los EE.UU. eran: seguridad militar, solidaridad política y beneficio económico, definido en ese entonces, ante todo, en términos de la importación por parte de los EE.UU. de materias primas y productos agrícolas de Latinoamérica así como de las inversiones norteamericanas en la región.

A lo largo de muchas décadas se dijo que Latinoamérica era importante para la defensa preventiva de los EE.UU. contra cualquier ataque militar por parte de un poder extra hemisférico. Cuando se construyó el Canal de Panamá a inicios del siglo XX, permitiéndole a los Estados Unidos proyectar su poder naval, tanto hacia el Atlántico como hacia el Pacífico, y convertirse así en un poder mundial, una red de estaciones carboníferas y bases navales en la zona del Caribe se tornó en un bien fundamental, protegiendo las líneas marítimas de comunicación. Durante las dos Guerras Mundiales y en el período de la Guerra Fría, las directivas militares asignaban alta prioridad a garantizar la defensa de este perímetro contra Alemania, la Unión Soviética o cualquier otro potencial adversario extra continental. América Latina fue también valorada como fuente principal de provisión de materiales estratégicos. Durante la primera mitad del siglo XX, América Latina fue, por mucho, la fuente más importante del petróleo importado por los EE.UU., así como también el proveedor más importante de otras materias primas necesarias con fines militares.

Latinoamérica fue también una piedra angular de la diplomacia norteamericana. La idea de Hemisferio Occidental – que los países de éste hemisferio están juntos entre sí y separados del resto del mundo, unidos por valores e intereses compartidos – fue un principio fundamental de la política exterior norteamericana, y de hecho de la política de muchas de las naciones latinoamericanas. Este concepto no fue mera retórica con fines ceremoniales; fue fundamental para la cooperación práctica en la Liga de las Naciones, las Naciones Unidas, la Organización de Estados Americanos, el Consejo Interamericano de Defensa, y otros lugares. Durante los primeros años de las Naciones Unidas, por ejemplo, el bloque latinoamericano representaba casi la tercera parte de los estados miembros de la Asamblea General, y su alineación con los EE.UU. en tema tras tema – relativos a Rusia, China, Corea, Palestina y otros – resultó de crítica importancia.

Latinoamérica fue también percibida como de gran valor económico para los Estados Unidos, tanto como principal fuente de importaciones agrícolas y minerales, así también como escenario de la inversión privada directa norteamericana. Latinoamérica fue, por lejos, el más importante de estos escenarios a lo largo de la primera mitad del siglo XX, proporcionando importantes oportunidades para la expansión económica de los EE.UU., posteriormente a la segunda Guerra Mundial, a medida que empresas norteamericanas desplazaron a compañías europeas de la industria y el comercio, complementando su previa participación en la minería, el comercio y los servicios públicos.

Si bien las afirmaciones acerca de la significación de América Latina respecto a la seguridad, diplomacia y economía norteamericana continuaron apareciendo largamente, no solo retóricamente, sino también en documentos de planificación estratégica, el hecho es que las tres razones de la supuesta importancia de Latinoamérica para los EE.UU. disminuyeron en forma constante desde mediados del siglo XX hasta los '90.

Cambios revolucionarios en la tecnología militar y en el comercio marítimo redujeron la importancia estratégica de América Latina, e incluso del Canal de Panamá, para los EE.UU. Los barcos súper tanques empleados en el transporte de petróleo se volvieron demasiado grandes para atravesar el Canal, como también sucedió con los portaaviones, en torno a los cuales se organizaron las fuerzas navales. El posible uso de Latinoamérica como potencial base para una amenaza misilística estratégica contra los EE.UU. terminó, en efecto, en 1992, con la crisis de los cohetes cubanos. Hacia fines del siglo XX, la relevancia de Latinoamérica para la seguridad militar de los EE.UU., era, en términos tradicionales, despreciable, si bien nadie lo proclamaba. La red de bases en torno al Caribe, ya no era importante. De hecho, la más grande de ellas, en la Bahía de Guantánamo en Cuba, cesó de tener una significativa importancia militar. En su lugar en los años recientes, Guantánamo se convirtió, primero, en un centro de detención de inmigrantes no autorizados, y luego, en un centro de interrogación de combatientes enemigos, nuevos cometidos relacionados a nuevas prioridades en un contexto internacional transformado.

El tradicional valor diplomático de América Latina para los EE.UU. también declinó rápidamente, comenzando en los '70 y los '80, cuando muchos países latinoamericanos expresaron su creciente solidaridad con el Tercer Mundo más que con los EE.UU., e hicieron prevalecer sus intereses independientemente de, y frecuentemente en contra, de los Estados Unidos. Por ejemplo, en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, en 1985, el único país de Latinoamérica y el Caribe que votó con los Estados Unidos en más de la mitad de los casos, fue la pequeña Granada, cuyo gobierno debía su propia existencia a la intervención militar de los EE.UU. en octubre de 1983. Cuba y Nicaragua se opusieron en más del 90% de los casos a la posición de EE.UU., pero más sorprendente aún, fue el hecho de que Brasil, México y Argentina se opusieron a la posición de los EE.UU. en el 84% de las votaciones. Los días del alineamiento automático se terminaron, a medida que las naciones latinoamericanas comenzaron a definir sus propios intereses como mejor les pareciera y no sobre la base de la presunta armonía del Hemisferio Occidental. Ya no bastó con asumir simplemente que la cooperación EE.UU.-América Latina se produciría; la cooperación debía ser acordada mutuamente, sobre la base de intereses y percepciones compartidas y del dar y recibir, no en presunciones o mandatos.

La relativa importancia económica de Latinoamérica para los EE.UU. también declinó a lo largo de varios años, si bien hubo algo así como un retorno a partir de mediados de los '90. Desde el tremendo estallido de la inversión norteamericana en Europa, Asia y el Medio Oriente, desde los '50 en adelante, y alguna desinversión en América Latina en los '60 y '70, (fundamentalmente en la extracción de recursos y en los sectores de servicios públicos), la importancia económica relativa de Latinoamérica y el Caribe para los EE.UU. disminuyó en forma pronunciada. La diversificación de los recursos y el uso de materiales sintéticos redujo para EE.UU. el valor de los recursos naturales y de las materias primas naturales latinoamericanas. En los '80, América Latina era aún moderadamente importante para unas pocas corporaciones particulares norteamericanas, pero no era de una alta prioridad para el rol mundial de la economía global de los EE.UU. Por la misma razón, los EE.UU. eran aún desproporcionadamente importante para las economías de muchos países latinoamericanos y caribeños. Pero muchos países latinoamericanos, especialmente de Sudamérica, comenzaron a diversificar sus relaciones económicas al margen de los EE.UU. – efectuando mayores inversiones, construyendo relaciones económicas y comerciales de unos con otros, así como con Europa, y con Asia, primero con Japón, y más recientemente, con China. Esta última tendencia ha ido tan lejos que un informe de la CEPAL advierte sobre el peligro de la dependencia latinoamericana de China; ¡no de los EE.UU.! Unos pocos países latinoamericanos, especialmente México, son aún importantes para la economía de los EE.UU., especialmente como mercados, pero la importancia conjunta de América Latina en la economía contemporánea norteamericana, es menor que la de Asia, Medio Oriente o Europa.

Este contexto se destaca, porque el poder inercial de los conceptos de larga data – repetidos en la retórica oficial y en los testimonios legislativos, presentación de presupuestos y en el discurso político - a veces oculta el hecho de que los viejos encuadres ya no son más aplicables. Se siguen haciendo declaraciones acerca de de la solidaridad del Hemisferio Occidental y de la cooperación Panamericana en seguridad, puntos de vista políticos y económicos que no resisten un examen crítico. Por la misma razón, se siguen haciendo comentarios por parte de algunos latinoamericanos, acerca de los rapaces designios norteamericanos en Latinoamérica, la nefasta influencia de las corporaciones estadounidenses y el supuesto control que el Pentágono ejerce sobre los militares latinoamericanos, con escasos o ningún punto de referencia contemporáneo. A menudo se repiten clichés que teniendo una base histórica, carecen de fundamento o relevancia contemporánea.

fundamental. Estos problemas incluyen al cambio climático, así como a otros temas medioambientales, la salud pública, la lucha contra la droga, el crimen organizado y las pandillas juveniles, la seguridad alimenticia, la protección del ciberespacio, la reforma del comercio internacional y de los regímenes financieros, poner freno a la proliferación nuclear y la lucha contra los movimientos terroristas internacionales. Desde el 9/11/2001, los funcionarios gubernamentales norteamericanos mencionarían típicamente los dos últimos puntos en primer lugar, pero los otros temas son también importantes y tal vez más aún, especialmente desde una perspectiva latinoamericana; una efectiva cooperación interamericana depende de que Washington comprenda esto. En cada una de estas importantes cuestiones, una o más naciones latinoamericanas son actores importantes en un contexto mundial debido a su impacto directo sobre estos temas y/o su influencia en las probabilidades de generar efectivas repuestas internacionales.

Tercero, unas pocas naciones latinoamericanas y del Caribe son aún importantes para la economía norteamericana, y algunas lo son cada vez más. Esto es particularmente cierto en el caso de aquellos países que constituyen grandes mercados para la exportación de bienes y servicios desde los EE.UU.; aquellos que ofrecen importantes oportunidades de inversión a empresas norteamericanas; y aquellos que son o pueden llegar a ser importantes fuentes de

las exportaciones norteamericanas y plazas para la inversión privada estadounidense. Algunos de ellos (nuevamente, en especial México), son actores importantes en lo que respecta al orden del día de asuntos transnacionales e internacionales, respecto a los cuales los EE.UU. necesitan socios cooperantes; asimismo, estos estados vecinos, plantean asuntos de derechos humanos y gobernanza democrática, así como humanitarios, que atraen la atención y la actividad de ciudadanos y organizaciones no gubernamentales estadounidenses.

Segundo, el marco sugiere que gestionar correctamente sus relaciones con Brasil es una creciente prioridad en la política exterior norteamericana. Brasil es una importante plaza financiera para las inversiones norteamericanas, así como un mercado sustancial y potencialmente aún más importante para los bienes y servicios estadounidenses; una fuente de energía potencialmente importante; y especialmente, por la actual y en un futuro mayor significación de Brasil como actor global para hacer frente a grandes desafíos que van del cambio climático a la proliferación nuclear, del comercio a la energía, del mantenimiento internacional de la paz a la gobernanza mundial. México, Argentina y Chile, son también relevantes de diferentes maneras y en distintos grados en el orden del día mundial de los EE.UU., pero ninguno puede rivalizar con la importancia de Brasil.

Una tercera implicación del marco propuesto, es que muchos de los países latinoamericanos les importan a los responsables de la política exterior norteamericana sobre todo en la medida que presentan y/o ayudan a resolver problemáticas cuestiones concretas, tales como narcóticos y delincuencia, enfermedades infecciosas, o la potencial explotación de una malograda gobernanza

de Uruguay, Mauricio Funes de El Salvador, Fernando Lugo en Paraguay o Leonel Fernández de la República Dominicana – todos ellos descendientes directos de partidos, movimientos y líderes, en contra de los cuales intervino EE.UU. en los ´60. Los EE.UU. mantiene discrepancias con Hugo Chávez de Venezuela, Evo Morales de Bolivia, Daniel Ortega de Nicaragua, los Castro en Cuba, y otros, pero hay evidentes límites en la intervención de los EE.UU. contra ellos, y existe una cooperación práctica entre los EE.UU. y los gobiernos de todos estos países, incluyendo a Cuba. Nadie espera ver a los marines desembarcando en Caracas, o a la CIA asesinando a Chávez o a Morales; por la misma razón, es improbable que Venezuela interrumpa sus exportaciones de petróleo a los EE.UU., y Bolivia busca inversión internacional de los EE.UU. y de otros países para desarrollar sus reservas de gas natural y litio.

La presencia comercial y de inversiones de China en las Américas, excede hoy por lejos la de la Unión Soviética o Alemania en períodos anteriores, pero la presencia de China no suscita gran preocupación a la política norteamericana. El intercambio comercial de China con muchos países latinoamericanos fortalece las economías de éstos países, ampliando de esta manera su potencial como mercados para los productos de los EE.UU. La presencia contemporánea de Rusia en las Américas, en parte comercial, pero también política y militar, tiene más que ver con los intentos rusos de demostrar que quieren ser tomados en cuenta en los escenarios internacionales (fundamentalmente respecto a otros asuntos), que con la presentación de cualquier desafío directo hacia los EE.UU. o sus intereses en el Hemisferio Occidental. Los esfuerzos de Irán por establecer vínculos con Venezuela, Brasil, Bolivia, Argentina, y potencialmente otros países, es el más significativo interés extra continental actual de la política de EE.UU., fundamentalmente porque los EE.UU. e Irán parecen estar en un claro rumbo de colisión, y por lo tanto se puede esperar que Irán utilice su presencia en las Américas para causarle problemas a los EE.UU. Las opiniones difieren acerca de la urgencia y la magnitud de ésta inquietud; las agencias de

Por varias décadas, la tendencia en la formulación de políticas de los EE.UU. ha sido la de

insuficiente y de hecho imposible en la práctica, son recíprocos e interactivos. Mayor

Las diferencias son naturales entre países grandes con diversos y complejos intereses, en los que la política exterior de ambos lados, es inevitablemente afectada por conflictivos intereses políticos internos, y por disputas económicas triviales. También es comprensible que estas diferencias son a veces, magnificadas por presunciones o resentimientos que reflejan mentalidades antiguas. En esta etapa, el desafío fundamental para las relaciones entre EE.UU. y Brasil, a pesar de las diferencias e historia, es la construcción de una mayor sinergia respecto a las principales cuestiones mundiales: el fortalecimiento de los regímenes de comercio, finanzas e inversión, desarrollo e implementación de medidas para afrontar el cambio climático; prevención y respuesta a pandemias; impedir la proliferación nuclear; reforma de los acuerdos de gobernanza internacional. Respecto a todas estas cuestiones, tanto Brasil como EE.UU. tienen mucho en juego. Sus intereses no son idénticos, pero son potencialmente compatibles. La tarea de la diplomacia es suavizar fricciones innecesarias y enfocarse con agudeza en cómo fortalecer los esfuerzos de cooperación entre ambos países, minimizando, mitigando y gestionando los conflictos. En Washington se reconoce cada vez más que esta debe ser una prioridad estratégica en los próximos años.

Ninguno de los países del Cono Sur está tan conectado o integrado con los EE.UU. como sus vecinos más cercanos, ni tampoco son tan grandes, poderosos y vinculados con el mundo, como Brasil.

Chile es la nación latinoamericana que participa más plenamente en la economía mundial, con las instituciones más fuertes, normas democráticas y prácticas más arraigadas. Ha logrado un amplio consenso en muchas políticas públicas claves, subyacente a un alto grado de predictibilidad que atrae inversión, nacional y extranjera, libera energías de todo tipo y facilita simultáneamente la planificación estratégica por parte del gobierno y del sector privado. Habiendo superado la profunda polarización ocurrida en los años de Allende y Pinochet, Chile ha gestionado exitosamente varias transiciones políticas, incluyendo el acceso al poder en 2010, del primer presidente proveniente de la oposición a la Concertación, la que desplazó del poder a Pinochet en 1989. Chile exporta menos de un cuarto de sus exportaciones a EE.UU., y hay pocos

durante la administración Reagan, a continuación poniendo distancia por algunos años; luego cambiando una vez más a una estrecha alineación voluntaria con Washington; y más recientemente, regresando a poner una distancia relativa, sin obligarse a una oposición consistente. Estas fluctuaciones tienen mucho más que ver con los ritmos de la política argentina que con causas internacionales o políticas norteamericanas; su efecto neto sobre los EE.UU. ha sido disminuir la estatura argentina a un nivel proporcional a su distancia geográfica y confiabilidad esperable. La mejor analogía en las relaciones internacionales de los EE.UU. es con un país europeo de tamaño mediano, a menudo crítico de Washington, pero con poca influencia internacional.

Los países de la cordillera andina –

- Ecuador, con partidos políticos extremadamente débiles e instituciones políticas y elites profundamente desacreditadas, ha recurrido a un nuevo liderazgo de un tecnócrata de

“Discurso sobre la oportunidad en las Américas”

Hillary R. Clinton, Secretaria de Estado de los Estados Unidos

El Centro Cultural Metropolitano de Quito, Ecuador

8 de junio de 2010

SECRETARIA CLINTON: Muchas gracias, señor alcalde. Gracias por su presentación y por el gran honor que esta venerable ciudad me ha ofrecido hoy. Es un placer personal para mí estar aquí con todos ustedes en esta ciudad que ha sido designada por la UNESCO como una de las maravillas culturales del mundo, y en este bello país. El presidente Correa me ha dicho cuatro o cinco veces que este es el país más diverso de entre los países pequeños del mundo. Estoy deseando volver en el futuro para conocerlo más por mí misma. (Aplausos).

Estoy muy agradecida al alcalde, y a todos ustedes, por acompañarme hoy para examinar nuestra visión compartida de una alianza entre nuestros países y los pueblos de las Américas. El pasado abril, en la Cumbre de las Américas, el presidente Obama prometió que Estados Unidos deseaba establecer una colaboración en pie de igualdad y con participación que se base en el respeto mutuo, los intereses comunes y los valores compartidos. Desde entonces, hemos estado trabajando para fomentar una verdadera comunidad en las Américas, una comunidad que realmente reconozca que, independientemente de que uno viva en Quito o en Los Ángeles, en Ottawa o en Buenos Aires, en muchos aspectos deseamos el mismo futuro para nuestros hijos.

Ahora bien, hemos tenido en ocasiones, Estados Unidos y América Latina, una historia contenciosa. Nunca lo negaría. Ha habido problemas reales y percepciones que a veces han

este momento de oportunidad para consolidar la democracia y el crecimiento económico, para desempeñar un papel en la resolución conjunta de problemas regionales e incluso mundiales, para avanzar en nuestro progreso y mejorar nuestros valores, y para reconocer nuestra interdependencia y utilizarla para mejorar los futuros de nuestros pueblos. Deseamos elevar lo mejor del pasado que compartimos y superar nuestras asperezas que con demasiada frecuencia han interferido e incluso nos han impedido avanzar.

Por tanto, la promesa es evidente, pero está lejos de concretarse. Por eso aunque este es un momento de oportunidad, es también un momento paradójico. Las economías crecen, pero la prosperidad todavía alcanza a muy pocos. El comercio florece, pero la desigualdad extrema todavía persiste. La guerra, afortunadamente, es rara, pero algunos barrios son tan peligrosos como una zona de combate. La democracia se arraiga, pero todavía proporciona demasiado poco a demasiadas personas.

Ayer en la Asamblea General de la OEA en Lima, tuve la oportunidad de hablar sobre uno de los cuatro pilares de nuestra visión para las Américas: instituciones eficaces y responsables de la gobernabilidad democrática. En dos días, en Barbados, con nuestros vecinos del Caribe, hablaré de otro pilar: la seguridad física de nuestros ciudadanos. Hace dos meses, en una reunión de la Alianza de Energía y Clima para las Américas en Washington, hablé sobre cómo podemos colaborar para avanzar hacia ese futuro de energía limpia y renovable, para ser mejores custodios de la tierra mientras continuamos extrayendo los combustibles fósiles que aún necesitamos, y para afrontar el cambio climático y las amenazas ecológicas.

Hoy quiero hablar del cuarto pilar de nuestra visión, y es, como dijo Simón Bolívar que las bases fundamentales de nuestro sistema político se derivan directa y exclusivamente del establecimiento y la práctica de la igualdad. Al celebrar este año el bicentenario de los movimientos de independencia de nuestro hemisferio, el mensaje adquiere una resonancia especial porque la independencia puede que tenga 200 años de antigüedad, pero la profunda desigualdad social y económica persiste todavía demasiado.

Cuando pienso en que lo que espero para mi propia hija es lo mismo que espero para todos los niños: la oportunidad de alcanzar el potencial que Dios les ha otorgado. Eso sólo se puede producir cuando las sociedades apoyan los esfuerzos de la familia y las comunidades de fe para crear una estructura de oportunidad. Esa estructura de oportunidad debe estar en el centro de nuestra visión común por la que trabajamos para alcanzar logros juntos, porque todos compartimos la responsabilidad de hacer avanzar este ideal, porque no sólo es un imperativo moral, sino también estratégico. No podemos ser productivos ni tener economías competitivas si no aprovechamos el potencial de todos nuestros ciudadanos. No podemos erradicar la violencia si no construimos comunidades fuertes y que incluyan a todos. No podemos fortalecer ni sostener la democracia cuando tantas personas se encuentran con oportunidades limitadas para ellas y sus hijos.

En resumidas cuentas, las Américas hoy en día tienen una oportunidad histórica y sin precedentes de consolidar el progreso como nunca antes. Pero tenemos que asegurarnos de que sea un compromiso compartido, no sólo un discurso o un fundamento político de una campaña, sino en el trabajo diario en el que participan no sólo los gobiernos, sino también el sector

privado, el sector sin fines de lucro, las universidades y la comunidad académica, y los grupos de creyentes de nuestras sociedades.

El presidente Obama y yo compartimos una visión estratégica de nuestra participación en el hemisferio. Trabajamos para crear una red de alianzas que amplíe las oportunidades y aumente la movilidad social. Ahora bien, podríamos debatir sin fin las causas primordiales de la falta de igualdad, pero la manera de avanzar no radica en litigar una y otra vez sobre el pasado, sino en

tradicionalmente contribuyen a hacer más ricos a los ricos, pero al mismo tiempo crean una clase

de la economía sino fuera de esta. Y la sociedad en su conjunto pierde los beneficios de esa productividad.

mediante los pactos del Desafío del Milenio con los países en desarrollo. Pero trabajaremos también para aumentar el comercio. El comercio entre Estados Unidos y nuestros socios alcanzó más de 600.000 millones de dólares al año. Tenemos que continuar reduciendo las barreras al comercio. La inversión anual de Estados Unidos ha alcanzado los 60.000 millones de dólares al año. Nuestras contribuciones a instituciones multilaterales como el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo también invierten millones en la región. Y los que trabajan en Estados Unidos envían a la región más de 50.000 millones de dólares en remesas.

De manera que, ¿cómo podemos aprovechar estos hechos? Bien, estamos analizando maneras de aprovechar lo que aportan las remesas para ayudar a países como Ecuador a mejorar su infraestructura y servicios. Ahora bien, a nivel individual, las remesas significan hijos e hijas que ayudan a madres y padres, los padres que hacen un sacrificio por sus hijos. Pero en su conjunto, representan un enorme recurso para un país. Así que estamos analizando cómo podemos desarrollar nuevas formas de incrementar el valor del dinero que viene de regreso, con el objetivo de brindar a pequeñas empresas y comunidades una oportunidad de prosperar. Estamos desarrollando nuevas maneras de aprovechar las remesas con la finalidad de ampliar el crédito para proyectos de desarrollo e infraestructura, sin quitar nada de los dólares que tan duramente se ha ganado y que se envía de regreso a las familias.

Queremos promover la inclusión financiera y por ese motivo recurrimos a la microfinanciación.

innovadores programas de protección social. Estamos creando en Estados Unidos una entidad denominada Cuerpo de Asesoría Electrónica, de manera que las pequeñas empresas que necesiten asesoría puedan ingresar en Internet y obtenerla de negocios similares en Estados Unidos.

Hemos dedicado más financiación a la educación y la inversión, hecho que el presidente Obama considera una inversión en nuestro propio futuro. Estamos aumentando el apoyo para lo que denominamos Centros Binacionales de Estados Unidos, que brindan a niños y adultos los recursos para estudiar inglés. Estamos iniciando un programa que ofrecerá a científicos de todo el hemisferio la oportunidad de trabajar en laboratorios estadounidenses. Estamos desarrollando también nuevos centros científicos que ayuden a impulsar la educación científica y proporcionen un foro de intercambio entre innovadores.

Considero que el talento es universal, pero la oportunidad no lo es. Hay muchas personas en este país, como en cualquier otro, que son innovadoras y tienen iniciativa empresarial. Resuelven problemas todos los días. Queremos brindarles más apoyo para que piensen con aún más ambición. Hemos dedicado 25 millones de dólares para programas relacionados con el género que ayuden a mejorar las oportunidades para la mujer. Hemos iniciado un diálogo político de alto nivel entre los gobiernos del hemisferio sobre cómo alcanzar la participación económica plena de la mujer. No se me ocurre ninguna manera mejor de celebrar el Año Interamericano de la Mujer. Ahora bien, todo esto es parte de la responsabilidad compartida que consideramos es la base de nuestra nueva alianza. No se trata de clientelismo, sino de alianzas.

El próx

Medio ambiente

“International Climate Change Governance: Will Redefining „Insiders Enable Global Progress?”

Nathan Hultman

The Brookings Institution

April 30, 2010

After the fizzle of Copenhagen, international climate change discussions entered a dull hibernation, in part because the intense and largely unsuccessful negotiations sapped the previous momentum of cooperation between governments, NGOs and other groups trying to strike a post-Kyoto global climate change bargain. Having envisioned yet failed to achieve such a grand compromise, many stakeholders retreated in subsequent months to analyze the causes of failure and to outline their next steps. After this convalescence, climate policy discussions are now restarting both internationally and in the United States.

Yet, despite some superficially obvious reasons for optimism—such as the global economic recovery, and the on-again, off-again prospect of U.S. climate legislation—there is still no clarity on the path toward a global climate agreement. Many vexing technical issues remain unresolved, such as reducing deforestation, reforming the Clean Development Mechanism, funding

A second factor that exacerbated tensions was the method of negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord and the ensuing disagreement about its legal status. The Danish text drew valuable time and attention away from negotiations to the point where no draft agreements were ready when world leaders convened. Several world leaders took it upon themselves to set to paper a few key elements of agreement. While this effort succeeded in producing the Copenhagen Accord and in setting out some new areas of agreement, many member states were not included in the discussions in order to reach agreement in the short time period. As a result, the usual procedures for consultation, plenary debate and discussion were not followed, and the resulting Accord was not a legally adopted text of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

A third factor underscoring tensions of climate governance is the sense that the U.S. may be pressuring reluctant countries to participate in the Copenhagen Accord. The Accord was always an agreement with President Obama's imprint since he exerted considerable effort in Copenhagen to solidify consensus around the document. However, not all countries have embraced it because of its unusual legal status with respect to the UNFCCC and its narrower scope of negotiation. To date, approximately 110 of 192 parties to the UNFCCC have reported

December, it should be seen less as an end in itself than as the basis for future negotiations in these areas.

However, of the many lessons from Copenhagen, these recent events have irritated a latent tension that must be acknowledged and addressed if there is to be the broad and comprehensive

“The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes?”

Anthony Bebbington

North American Congress on Latin America, Report on the Americas

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On June 5, two months of gathering indigenous protest across the Peruvian Amazon culminated in one of the country's most tragic moments in many a year.¹ Several thousand indigenous and non-indigenous people had assembled in the Amazonas town of Bagua, blocking the highway and demanding the derogation of executive decrees on which they had not been consulted and that they felt threatened their future access to land, and therefore their livelihoods, in the territories they have long occupied.² Also gathered were police forces, sent in by the central government to re-open the highway. In a still unclear sequence of events, shooting began.

By the end of the day, and though numbers are still disputed, five Awajún-Wampís indigenous people and five mestizo townspeople were confirmed dead, along with 23 policemen, 11 of whom were killed in retaliation by indigenous people as they were guarding a pumping station of the North Peruvian Oil Pipeline. One hundred and sixty-nine indigenous and mestizo civilians and 31 police were confirmed injured. A report issued in July by the national Ombudsman's office found that all the indigenous people involved in the conflict had been accounted for in the villages its representatives had visited and that no formal complaints of missing persons had been received. Indigenous leaders, however, said that many more remote villages had not been visited and that reliable figures on the missing or killed would not be available unless an independent commission were created to investigate the events.

While the roots of this confrontation run deep, the ticker on the time bomb was set more recently. On October 28, 2007, Peru's president, Alan García, published *El síndrome del perro del hortelano* (The Dog in the Manger

Syndrome), the first in a series of newspaper articles in which he laid out his interpretation of Peru's ills and his vision of how to cure them. The problem, he argued, was that Peru's immense natural resource endowments are not legally titled, and therefore cannot be traded, do not attract investment, and do not generate employment. The result: continuing poverty. This situation persists, he maintained, because of the law of the dog in the manger, which says if I can't do it, nobody can do it —a position argued by the old anti-capitalist Communists of the 19th century, who disguised themselves as the protectionists of the 20th century and then changed T-shirts again in the 21st century to be environmentalists.

Hydrocarbons and mining in particular have recently seen significant hikes in capital investment. They have also triggered the most contentious arguments between the state, the private sector, and social movements over the territorial, environmental, and human implications of their expansion. The result for those who live near extractive enterprises has been tension and conflict.

Under siege may sound too strong, but in large parts of the continent, peoples and environments are increasingly being pressured from all sides. In the words of anthropologist Federica Barclay, who has spent a lifetime working on the Peruvian Amazon: Everywhere there is increasing unrest. I have seen it in various places throughout the past two years. People are overwhelmed.⁷

Much of Latin American economic and social history could be read as a long engagement with extraction. At times the emphasis has been on escaping the limits of the extractive economy—an important theme in the region's import-substitution industrialization policies that lasted from mid-century through to the 1980s. At other times, denouncing extraction has mattered most, as in Eduardo Galeano's classic *Open Veins of Latin America* and a long list of social protests that have challenged the relations of exploitation and dispossession that underlie the extractive economy.⁸ Yet today, many governments of all political hues seem primarily concerned to make the very most of extraction.

Believing that with their different mixes of policies and politics they can escape the resource curse—i.e., the underperformance and pathologies said to accompany economic-development models that depend heavily on natural resources—governments as distinct as García's in Peru and that of Evo Morales in Bolivia share an approach to extraction that can only be described as optimistic. Of course, the potential economic gains are very high, and more than one government in the region is financing its social policy with income from mining and hydrocarbons. But, as the recent violence in the Peruvian Amazon suggests, the human and political costs of such a development strategy can also be significant. Such costs, which rarely adorn the pages of environmental-impact statements, however important these may be, are the costs that come from rewriting the region's political ecology.

To begin with, the extractive frontier is an aggressive one in all senses, not least the geographical. In Peru, some 64 hydrocarbon blocks (areas in which companies acquire the rights to explore for, and ultimately exploit, oil and gas) cover more than 70% of the country's Amazonian territory. Eleven blocks overlay protected areas, 17 overlap reserves for indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation, and 58 overlap lands titled to indigenous peoples.⁹ In Ecuador about two thirds of the Amazon is zoned for hydrocarbon expansion. Meanwhile in Bolivia, although the area so far contracted is less, 55% of national territory is considered to be of potential hydrocarbon interest. Indeed, under the current Morales administration, hydrocarbon operations have significantly expanded in the country's northern Amazon basin, generating consternation among indigenous groups and tensions between them and the government.

⁷ Federica Barclay, 'Un reclamo justo,' *Revista Ideele* (Lima), no. 193 (June 2009), www.revistaideele.com/node/468?page=0,3.

⁸ As discussed in David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford University Press, Blackwell, 2003).

⁹ Matt Finer, Clinton N. Jenkins, Stuart L. Pimm, Brian Keane, and Carl Ross, 'Oil and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon: Threats to Wilderness, Biodiversity, and Indigenous Peoples,' *PLoS ONE* 3, no. 8 (2008), available at plosone.org.




Figure 1 (above), drawn from a recent and influential inventory of hydrocarbon concessions and contracts in the western Amazon, shows the sheer physical extent of this process. Meanwhile, new hydrocarbon concessions have been carved out of the Central American isthmus, for example, in Mosquitia and the Pacific coast. Thus, García's manifesto must be seen as part of a far larger set of policies and political commitments that have allowed this geographical transformation to occur. Likewise, Bagua has to be seen as part of a wider set of consequences and responses to this expansion—some of which have already occurred, many of which are yet to come, even as García and other presidents in the region argue that such protests are part of an international conspiracy rather than legitimate expressions of citizen concern.¹⁰

The image is similar for mining. At the beginning of the 1990s, Latin America received about 12% of global investment in mining; today the share is around one third.¹¹ Some estimate that more than half of Peru's peasant communities are affected by mining concessions, while up until mid-2008 the geography of mining concessions in Ecuador suggested something similar.¹² Investment and exploration have likewise grown in Argentina, with a 740% increase in foreign

¹⁰ See Alan García Pérez, A la fe de la inmensa mayoría, *Expreso* (Lima), June 29, 2009; for Evo Morales's statement to the same effect, see Agencia Boliviana de Información, Morales denuncia estrategias para evitar exploración de hidrocarburos en Bolivia, July 10, 2009.

¹¹ José de Echave C., Mining in Peru: Between the Transformation of Conflicts and the Programmatic Challenge, paper presented at a seminar of the Programme on Territories, Conflicts and Development, University of Manchester, United Kingdom, October 22, 2007, www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes/seminars.

¹² José de Echave C., Los retos actuales del movimiento social vinculado a la lucha por los derechos de las comunidades frente a las industrias extractivas: el caso peruano, paper presented at the conference Rethinking Extractive Industry, York University, Toronto, March 5–7, 2009.

investment since 2003.¹³ The conflicts and socio-environmental preoccupations around the Marlin mine in Guatemala described in the interview with activist Gregoria Crisanta Pérez (see page 16) are part of this wider whole.

As with hydrocarbons, what matters about these mining concession geographies is not only their size but also the degree to which they overlap with other geographies. For example, they overlap with community and territorial claims, as well as with water resources. Many of the more promising mining concessions are located in headwaters. More generally, the granting of concessions and the strategic management of water resources seem to be two processes that, in many countries, move along parallel tracks. As a result, in Peru, between a quarter and two thirds of many of the country's main watersheds are covered by concessions. The three watersheds that supply greater metropolitan Lima, a chronically water-constrained metropolis of more than 8 million people, have 41%, 40%, and 30% of their area overlapped by mining concessions, respectively.¹⁴

This is a problem because modern mining requires large quantities of water for separating minerals from rock, a process that also often involves the use of toxic substances like cyanide. At

and Ecuador's governments seem just as likely as Peru's to tell activists and indigenous groups to get out of the way of national priorities, just as likely to allow extractive industry into fragile and protected ecologies, and just as determined to convince indigenous peoples that extractive industry is good for them too, without fulfilling their right to free, prior, and informed consultation (much less full consent).

As in Peru, hydrocarbon concessions in Bolivia overlap with protected areas and indigenous territories. In the departments of La Paz, Beni, and Cochabamba, significant parts of the Madidi and Isiboro Securé National Parks and of the Pilon-Lajas Biosphere Reserve are covered by hydrocarbon contracts. In the Gran Chaco of Tarija, most of the Aguaragüe National Park—co-managed by the Consejo de Capitanes Guaraníes de Tarija, who also deem it Guaraní territory—has been affected by contracts given to Petrobras and Petroandina that allow for exploratory seismic testing and drilling, while the Chinese company Eastern Petrogas is set to operate in the

consortium led by the Spanish company Repsol YPF) wrote to the government complaining about its failure to address its concerns, the response from the Morales administration was less than supportive.

Meanwhile, in Aguarañe, Quintín Valeroso of the Asamblea Pueblo Guaraní Yaku Igua, based in Yacuiba, complained in May that the government had not recognized the APG Yaku Igua as the relevant indigenous organization for carrying out consultation processes. There has been no consultation for any of these projects with indigenous people, he said, adding: We demand the government carry out the consultation process. We deserve respect.¹⁶ Increasing tensions between the Guaraní and MAS, above all around extraction, have sparked discussions within the national Asamblea de Pueblos Guaraní reconsidering its political options prior to the elections in December—calling into question any automatic allegiance to MAS and Morales.¹⁷

These expressions of concern are not only localized. In April, Adolfo Chávez, the executive secretary of the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), a lowland indigenous organization headquartered in Santa Cruz, commented: Now we have to talk about why it is that the permission of indigenous peoples is not being requested for hydrocarbons exploration in the Tierras Comunitarias de Origen.¹⁸

In July, Bolivia's principal national indigenous organizations met in La Paz for the First National Meeting of the Natural Resource Secretaries of Indigenous Campesino Organizations. Among the declarations of the meeting were that extractive activities in indigenous-campesino territories violate our collective rights as recognized in the Political Constitution of the State (CPE), Laws and International Treaties, and that this occurs because the ministries of hydrocarbons and mining do not allow for the implementation of a process of prior, free, informed and obligatory consultation and participation.

We condemn the actions of the Ministry of Hydrocarbons in its visits to Mosen and Lecos communities, the delegates resolved in yet stronger language, referring to the government's overtures to gain local support for YPFB-Petroandina's Lliquimuni oil-exploration project.¹⁹ Morales appears to interpret such issues as the effect of NGO manipulation: Unfortunately some NGOs use some union leaders in order to oppose and obstruct the environmental licenses

worked closely with the industry (in this case dominated by Canadian companies) in the process of drawing up new legislation to replace the mandate.

Socio-environmental movement organizations felt largely excluded from this process—which culminated in a new mining law (passed in January) that they feel favors transnational companies and large-scale proj

technology that characterizes the elite-led development model embodied in initiatives like IIRSA.

Furthermore, this new debate must consider in practical, and not merely discursive, terms what other models of development might *feasibly* better serve Latin American societies—bearing in mind the fiscal constraints that limit governments' room for maneuver, regardless of how relatively progressive their platforms may be.

We have, then, a tangle of currents that coexist within socio-environmental protests, and they can and do pull movements in different directions. The tensions between the first two, more conservation-minded environmentalisms and latter three, more socially concerned positions are clear. Perhaps more thorny are the tensions that exist among the latter three, all of which might be asso

both the Ombudsman and socio-environmental movements in elaborating strategies and proposals.

In the end, whether such steps toward institutional change progress far will depend considerably on the geopolitical relationships in which the extractive economy is embedded. In Peru, the position that the United States takes on whether the decrees being protested in Bagua really *were* necessary to satisfy the government's free trade agreement with the United States will matter. Even if the Peruvian government's motivations are simply to facilitate extractive investment, it has used the free trade agreement to assert the need for some of these decrees (interestingly, a prestigious consultancy in Peru, Apoyo, issued a report in June suggesting that the decrees could be repealed without threatening the trade agreement).²⁵ Elsewhere the geopolitical weight of the United States is declining, as extraction becomes an increasingly important element of relationships with China, Russia, Brazil, India, Venezuela, and Canada. If, and how far, these governments worry about the environmental and social consequences of extraction will go a long way in determining the scope of progressive change.

The human cost of the Bagua incident was, of course, immense. Many hope, however, that the lives lost and rights violated will force the Peruvian government and industry to accept the need for legal and policy changes that give greater guarantees to human rights, self-determination, and environmental quality in territories where extractive industry takes place. If this *is* the final effect of Bagua, the question is whether the same sort of change can be secured elsewhere in the region

The findings in this book suggest that climate change may push the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) beyond their ability to cope. Poverty, inequality, water stress, disease incidence, and migration patterns are and will be measurably affected by climate change, which will affect people's livelihoods in unprecedented ways.

The LAC region is one of

mosquitoes, with severe implications for human health. They also affect the range and yields of crops, with implications for the viability of traditionally grown crop varieties and for agricultural practices, food production and trade, and food security. In adults, temporary malnutrition reduces body mass, immunity, and productivity, but the results are rarely permanent. In children it can stunt growth, impede brain development, or cause death. Hence, risk is increased that climate change may cause an intergenerational downward spiral in human potential. Higher air temperatures also cause human health problems directly, including raising mortality rates among infants, the elderly, and other vulnerable groups. Further, higher temperatures combined with

Water Scarcity

Although abundant in the region as a whole, water is scarce at the local level in the same areas. Increased glacier melt, reductions in rainfall, rising sea levels, and more frequent extreme weather events reduce both the availability and quality of water for human use. Water scarcity in turn has three major social implications: first, it affects domestic water use and agricultural output, thereby increasing the risk of food insecurity; second, it affects the range and transmission of vector- and waterborne diseases, which adversely affects health; and third, it disrupts entire livelihood models, which may lead to migration and conflict. The social impacts of water scarcity are growing and are being felt at a local level.

By 2050, the number of people facing water scarcity in Latin America and the Caribbean could rise from more than 20 million today to more than 75 million. Some areas are particularly vulnerable to water scarcity. Arid or semiarid rural subregions in northeast Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile will experience a 20 percent reduction in water run-off due to reduced rainfall by 2050. In the Andean region, the melting of intertropical glaciers will severely restrict water availability, putting close to 40 million people, or 70 percent of the Andean population, at risk of losing water supply for drinking, farming, and energy generation by 2020. In urban centers with high concentrations of poverty, where freshwater availability is already low, population growth and dense urbanization patterns, along with growing pressure for economic development, push up the demand for existing water. In many downstream rural communities, it is not uncommon for contaminated waters to be tapped for household uses and irrigation, and as water becomes scarcer, more water will be withdrawn from low-quality sources.

Concerted action is needed to devise integrated water resource management methods through decentralization and community participation. Because both water scarcity and its social impacts are local, integrated solutions should be tailored to local circumstances and should give voice and representation to marginalized groups, whose livelihoods are affected the hardest by climate change. Greater technical and institutional cooperation is needed between water managers and climate and development specialists to devise better solutions to local water scarcity. Specific

- Increase awareness of disaster risk and risk reduction through television and radio broadcasting.

Rural Livelihoods

The rural poor are particularly vulnerable to climate change because of their high dependence on natural resources. Environmental deterioration of the natural resource base—for example through global warming, which affects crop yields and viability as well as fish migration patterns—will directly affect families and communities that depend on these food sources for nutrition as well as income generation. For the rural poor, who often lack the human and financial capital to diversify their livelihoods, the depletion of existing assets increases the risk of poverty and internal migration. Particularly vulnerable are agrarian communities and artisanal fishermen, as well as communities dependent on ecotourism.

Agrarian communities. The expected impacts of climate change and climatic variability will directly affect food supplies, and for millions they will endanger food security. By eroding natural resources and physical assets, climate change will make farming more difficult and unpredictable. Poor small-scale cultivators, pastoralists, and day laborers tend to live in arid and semiarid regions, mountain slopes or plateaus, and tropical rainforests, all fragile environments that often suffer from environmental degradation. Poor dryland farming is particularly at risk. Some of the major effects will come from increased frequency and severity of droughts and floods, which degrade farmland through erosion and desertification and damage farm property as well as public infrastructure such as roads and irrigation channels, with consequences for production capacity and market access. Reduced water availability will particularly affect grain crops and livestock production in Central America (Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama), the Andes, and parts of Argentina, Brazil, and Ch

Artisanal fishing. Climate change and variability, in the form of storms, increasing sea surface temperatures, and rising sea levels, will significantly worsen current environmental problems that threaten the livelihood and sometimes the food supply of artisanal fishing communities. Changes in the migration patterns of fish stocks due to changing sea-surface temperatures, and the destruction of fishermen's physical capital during natural disasters threaten the livelihoods of artisanal fishermen. The particular vulnerability context of small-scale fishermen relates to their lack of access to insurance and property rights, as the globalization of trade and the privatization of access rights undermine their reliance on traditional areas for fishing. In addition, early warning systems often do not reach the remote location of small-scale fishing communities, leaving fishing villages and their assets vulnerable to sudden extreme weather events.

Better planning and improved management of natural resources can help build the resilience of small-scale fishing communities. Aquaculture—if designed to be pro-poor, sustainable, and environmentally friendly—can potentially provide an important source of livelihood for fishermen losing their jobs. Compared with what is typical at present, however, such aquaculture projects require the establishment of much clearer land rights that support the interest of indigenous and impoverished communities, and they should ensure that the local community holds the right to manage production. Marine protected areas offer another alternative livelihood for communities previously dependent on fishing, while at the same time safeguarding coastal marine habitats. Key policy recommendations to support climate change adaptation in artisanal fishing communities include the following:

- Manage fish stocks better by means of tradable quotas, and so forth.
- Protect aquaculture against climate change by building deeper ponds and selecting species resilient to saltwater intrusion, temperature changes, and sea level rise.
- Establish marine protected areas and support local livelihoods by retraining and employing former local fishermen in safeguarding coastal marine habitats.

Ecotourism. The fastest-growing segment of the tourism industry, with 6 percent annual growth, ecotourism is especially vulnerable to climate change because of its close reliance on the integrity of ecosystems. Particularly popular among poor communities, ecotourism offers an alternative to farmers and fishermen whose livelihoods may already be threatened by climate change. While promoted for its pro-poor focus and local ownership, development of ecotourism projects is too often implemented without consideration for safeguarding the investment against climate change and variability. In the case of an extreme weather event, that could put entire communities at risk of losing their jobs and their investment.

Development of sustainable ecotourism will require the timely implementation of specific environmental measures to protect natural assets, physical infrastructure, and local jobs against climate change. Building the resilience of poor communities economically dependent on ecotourism will call for better zoning for new developments, the consistent application of environmental impact assessments, and the involvement of local communities in protecting the

natural resource base. Key policy recommendations to support climate change adaptation in the tourism sector include the following:

- Develop and implement new building codes and policies to restrict development in near-shore zones and areas at high risk of damage from climate change.
- Incorporate detailed environmental impact assessments to identify climate risks and assess viability of planned resorts.
-

capacity needed to protect livelihoods affected by climate change. Key policy recommendations include the following:

- Enhance human capital of the urban poor, notably the provision and quality of education, health care, and other social protection services.
- Improve property rights of the poor.
- Upgrade high-risk housing and utilities infrastructure such as safe water supply, sanitation, and electricity, and enforce proper building codes.
- Update disaster preparedness plans to establish roles and responsibilities, and develop plans of action for immediately before and after an extreme weather event.
- Implement relocation programs to safe, alternative housing, with clean water, sanitation, and electricity at affordable prices. Programs should inform residents of the importance of vacating high-risk areas, while being sensitive to the costs borne by the people affected, especially if they have to move away from current income opportunities.

Human Health

Changes in temperature, precipitation patterns, and extreme weather events have growing direct and indirect impacts on health. Climate change is likely to expand the geographic range of vector-borne diseases and lengthen their transmission season. Dengue fever could become one of the major health risks resulting from climate change and variability, and new, more virulent strains are emerging. This disease is already extending its reach in Mexico and central South America, and by the 2050s its transmission rates are likely to have grown two to five times in most parts of South America, putting many cities at risk, including São Paulo, Caracas, and Mexico City. The risks from malaria are particularly serious when it spreads into new areas where immunity levels are low. Local changes in temperature, rainfall, and humidity are expected to cause malaria to advance into areas not previously affected, while the disease is projected to become less common in some areas where it is currently endemic.

The expected increase in the incidence of floods will lead to more outbreaks of waterborne diseases, and increasing temperatures will create conditions allowing pathogens to multiply faster. Waterborne diarrheal diseases, including cholera, thrive where the lack of safe drinking water and sanitation makes good hygiene difficult. This situation is much exacerbated in the chaotic conditions following natural disasters. These are by far the deadliest group of diseases associated with the environment, killing almost 20 times as many people in the LAC region in 2002 as malaria and dengue fever combined.

Projections of the biophysical effects of climate change and variability suggest that an additional 1 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean could be short of food by 2020. Malnutrition in the region will be affected by droughts as well as by floods, which not only destroy croplands but also cause vector- and waterborne diseases that increase the risk of malnutrition. Malnutrition is the main source of mortality from both malaria and diarrhea; a body

- Implement simple, community-based mechanisms for purifying and storing water that prevent parasites from thriving.
- Implement low-cost programs to promote household hygiene, and expand nutritional programs for poor households at risk of malnutrition.
- Improve access to health care for migrant populations, and improve access to safe water and sanitation in urban shantytowns.

Migration

Internal migration in response to climate change is already occurring in the LAC region and seems likely to increase. Across the region during 1988–2003, one-third of the rural population aged 15–

- Educate local populations about climate change and create programs that offer training in alternative livelihoods to populations at risk of migration.
- Develop strategies to help indigenous communities adapt to climate change and variability; the strategies must capture the diversity of their livelihood strategies and respect the role and efficiency of their cultural institutions.
- Enhance research on the potential effects of increased migration, including diseases affecting crops and decreased agricultural productivity.

Conflict

Climate change may exacerbate existing risks of conflict rooted in socioeconomic factors. That may happen for several reasons, for example, if climate change diminishes the supplies of food, water, forests, energy, and land or encourages migration. Other dangers will occur if climate change undermines the capacity of the state, for example, by raising the costs of infrastructure in remote areas, thus limiting the reach of the state; by eroding fiscal resources; or by weakening the legitimacy of a state if it cannot provide basic needs for affected populations. If natural disasters are more frequent and severe, chaotic conditions may provide opportunities for rebel groups to challenge the government's authority.

- Undertake poverty and social impact analysis to understand the social implications of climate change, including violent and nonviolent conflict, migration, inequality, and

more equitable access to local, national, and international institutions and their resources. Another key aspect of effective responsiveness relates to innovation in financial products that give social protection for climate change–affected households and communities. Elaborated in more detail in the section on financial capital below, these products enhance the policy options available to local and national governments to help families rebuild their livelihoods after a natural disaster. Finally, an equally critical aspect of good governance is related to slow-onset disasters, such as increasing water scarcity. What is often needed is a comprehensive strategy to build technical capacity across key public actors, especially to enhance the ability to integrate climate change aspects into sectoral approaches such as integrated water resource management. By analyzing the institutional integration of, for example, water issues and the impact of climate change on water resources in different areas of government, it is possible to identify what gaps need to be filled in human resource skills, technical capacity, and organizational processes. International donors can support this learning process to improve governance and facilitate improved decentralization and development of partnerships.

Infrastructure must be developed that is designed to withstand climate-induced tension, such as increased soil erosion or mudslides, to secure emergency access, and to protect health and assets. Building lasting physical infrastructure is a fundamental element in any national and local adaptation plan and is essential to fulfilling the objectives of reaching the target groups and delivering an effective response. Given the scarcity of resources, the urgency of the matter, and the longevity of large-scale infrastructure projects, the World Bank and other donors can effectively incorporate participatory climate adaptation into projects in water and sanitation, roads and bridges, and electricity, whether these are already in progress or in the pipeline.

Prong 2. Develop social capital in local communities: voice, representation, and accountability. The ways in which individuals and groups within a community interact with each other constitute the community's social

and implement adaptation practices. However, for local institutions to function effectively, strong institutional ties with the national government are required to ensure a continued exchange of information. For example, incorporating the data and knowledge collected at the local level into regional and national adaptation strategies is contingent on integrating power down through the system, while at the same time keeping governance efficient.

Drawing on local knowledge and institutions in designing adaptation measures is essential to achieving sustainable adaptation. The findings in this book repeatedly emphasize the importance of actions that are conceived and executed locally, using area-based, decentralized approaches to

recommendations are presented below in each of the following asset categories: physical, human, social, cultural, natural, and financial. All these categories are interconnected, and actions aimed at the same adaptation objective will be seen to overlap.

Physical Capital

Recommended actions to strengthen physical capital focus on improving public works and infrastructure, with the wider goal of creat

communities and national climate change planners: it serves to strengthen livelihood resilience as well as to promote sustainable outcomes through local participation.¹

Natural Capital

Preserving the natural resource base must be part of both urban and rural adaptation strategies.

to focus future case studies on how integrated water resource management (IWRM) can be tailored to local circumstances and how scientific knowledge about climate change and IWRM principles is being applied on the ground.

Current research on rural livelihoods tends to focus on how extreme events affect poor rural households. An increasing need exists to better understand how climate change and variability affect the long-term sustainability of agricultural systems in marginal environments. Research should focus on how complex agrarian and livestock systems can adapt to climate changes and variability and assess the coping capacity of rural communities in different regions. Such

The analysis of climate-induced migration has shown that it is possible to quantify the amount of internal and international migration attributable to climate change. Yet to get an overall sense of future climate induced migration, similar types of analyses should be repeated for other countries in the LAC region and beyond. Great variations in climatic conditions, levels of vulnerability, and projected climate change among different countries and subregions will require that future research focus on the specific dynamics of the local context. The study reported in this book did not consider migration due to changes in extreme events because the impacts of extreme events at the m

Migración

“Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform”

Years before the statue was built -- years before it would be seen by throngs of immigrants craning their necks skyward at the end of long and brutal voyage, years before it would come to symbolize everything that we cherish -- she imagined what it could mean. She imagined the sight of a giant statue at the entry point of a great nation -- but unlike the great monuments of the past, this would not signal an empire. Instead, it would signal one's arrival to a place of opportunity and refuge and freedom.

Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand, she wrote,

A mighty woman with a torch...
From her beacon-hand
Glow world-wide welcome...
Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp! ...
Give me your tired, and your poor,

Comercio y finanzas

deserve that name. During the coming regional elections, on October 3, as much as 90,000 candidates in the entire country are running for regional and local office. Some optimists talk of an ebullient civic awakening. Others may be afraid of a potential balkanization. Even in San Isidro, the high income main residential district of Lima, as much as 11 different candidates are running for mayor.

In comparison with Colombia and Chile, two Andean and Pacific neighbors of comparable size, Peru has two strong weaknesses: an overcrowded and inefficient political system and the lack of a strong and capable civil service in the administration of the State, including obviously the Police and the Judiciary, a complicated matter in a country that needs strong law and order to fight against drug trafficking. Probably most benefits of first-generation reforms –those that can be adequately managed by a competent team at the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank– are by now over. Second-generation reforms require a better management of the public sector and sounder politics. But Peruvians are, nevertheless, surprisingly optimistic about their future. A recent survey among Peru's top private managers projected a 6% annual average growth for the coming years as well as a more stable political situation. For a country that two decades ago looked hopeless –gas prices needed to be multiplied 30 times to balance the fiscal deficit in 1990– it is a surprising and much welcomed turnaround.

“In South America, a Mine of Riches and an Economic Sinkhole”

Since then Mr. Piñera has consulted experts from around the world on how best to build a rescue hole at an unprecedented depth of 700 meters — nearly half a mile. And he has sought advice from NASA and others on how to keep the miners physically and mentally healthy in a windowless and confined space for so many weeks.

Every night I thought, 'What can we do beyond what has already been done?' he said. The question could also describe the economic challenges ahead in Chile's next hundred years.

Pascale Bonnefoy contributed reporting from Santiago, Chile.

“What's Next for Latin America After the Global Crisis?”

Mauricio Cárdenas

The Brookings Institution

May 2010

Time Magazine recently named Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as one of the world's 100 most

However, low growth is not the only problem. Of the 15 most unequal countries in the world, 10 n th

(1989); Colombia (1991); Paraguay (1992); Peru (1993); Argentina, Guatemala and Nicaragua (1994); Venezuela (1999); Ecuador (2008); and Bolivia (2009). Although the effects of these reforms on institutional performance have been varied, social policies and social expenditures have gained preponderance across the region. There have been successes, such as increased enrollment rates in primary and secondary schools, but many problems remain such as low educational quality and low enrollment rates in pre-primary and tertiary education, especially for the poor. On the positive note, a large number of Latin American countries have implemented social interventions through programs based on conditional cash transfers (CCTs), which have become a model for the rest of the world. The existing evaluations suggest that these programs, however small, are effective ways of redistributing income to low-income households, while at

domestic resource available in order to increase public expenditures, which occurred in Argentina with the privately held pension assets.

Industrial policies are another area of interesting differences. They range from the very timid in market-friendly economies fearful of past mistakes and excesses to outright nationalization of key sectors and industries in the extended ALBA countries. However, a new paradigm has emerged in Brazil, where industrial policies have been effective in promoting the development of new sectors and leveraging the global outreach of some key Brazilian corporations. The more interesting result is the emergence of the Brazilian multinational or *multilatina* that typically has more business abroad than in Brazil, such as Gerdau and JBS. The advent of these corporations explains why Brazil is now the world's fourth largest agricultural exporter, and the world's biggest exporter of several food commodities, including beef, chicken, orange juice, green coffee, sugar, ethanol, tobacco and soya complex. Brazilian *multilatinas*

Mexico is an interesting case because it has experienced subpar economic growth --even before 2008- 2009 global financial crisis—despite its pro-market economic strategy. Although a full discussion of this deserves more space, the conventional wisdom is that the state monopoly in the energy sector is turning out to be a very costly strategy. Mexico needs to increase its oil production and it is clear that PEMEX cannot do the job alone. In addition, many in Mexico complain about the lack of competition in key sectors, such as telecoms, public utilities and other services. The current and past administrations have tried to reform matters, but political gridlock has prevented significant progress. More worrisome is the lack of consensus on the political reform that will improve the workings of Mexico's nascent democracy. However, Mexico's adherence to sound macroeconomic policies will please international financial markets, which will continue to provide funds to the private and public sectors at relatively low rates.

At the other extreme is Venezuela, where a freefall of its economy has started. Despite high oil prices, ongoing forced nationalizations have stamped out private capital, which is now seeking refuge in assets abroad. With the government no longer able to meet the demand for dollars, a new law was enacted last week criminalizing foreign currency transactions in the parallel market. The exchange rate is now out of control and so is inflation. In this scenario, the economy is expected to contract once again this year. However, no one expects a smooth transition of power in Venezuela any time soon. Although Bolivia and Ecuador are experiencing somewhat better economic outlooks, their demise is only a matter of time. Low private investment is eroding productive capacity in these countries, where the rule of law and the protection of property rights is also receding according to the World Bank's governance indicators.

In Argentina, in order for the government to sustain high public expenditures, it needs to reach an agreement with bondholders that did not participate in the 2005 restructuring and simultaneously come to terms with the IMF on the issue of Article IV consultations. This will not mean a Greektype program, but will bring transparency to economic policies and data. However, a shift in policies --including the return to a more market-friendly development strategy—will have to wait until the change in government in 2011.

To conclude, Latin America is rapidly becoming an attractive investment destination. Households, firms and governments are not excessively leveraged, explaining the very limited contagion in the aftermath of the Lehman debacle. The same applies to recent events in Europe, which until now have not had a significant impact on spreads on Latin American sovereign and corporate bonds. This suggests that the region is now perceived as a better asset class than a decade ago. However, countries in the region will follow divergent economic growth paths in the next few years. Some countries will consolidate growth with equity while others are heading to economic disaster, repeating a cycle of short-lived economic expansions followed by protracted contractions that is well known to Latin America.

Medios de comunicación

“The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy: A Decision-Making”

Shubham Srivastava

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However, in my opinion, the first question to be asked regarding the impact of the media on foreign policy making decisions concerns how each of these actors, the media and policy makers, relate to foreign events.

This paper tries to overcome the obstacle of excluding the mass media from the foreign policy process and suggests an analytical framework which focuses on the role of the media in this process. This framework perceives the mass communication networks as parts of the environments in which the international actor (mainly nation-states) exists and acts. The media have a twofold role in such environments. First, they provide input into the process as an independent variable added to environments described in the former models of Snyder et al., Brecher and Papadakis and Starr. Here the leaders react to the perceived reality as constructed by the press and take it into consideration (i.e., the CNN effect). Second, it is part of the environment which foreign policy makers try to affect or influence by making their decisions. This means that leaders who perform in an environment which includes the media take political decisions to solve problems, but at the same time try to make such decisions that will improve their image or develop a campaign that will affect the media dealing with the relevant international events and interactions. This is the output environment component of the environment. This incorporates the media into the framework as an environment which encircles the decision-making process while serving as an input for decisions as well as a sounding board for the output – the policy.²

COVERAGE

The media relate to events through coverage (or lack of coverage one may add). However, when it comes to foreign news, there are mixed trends. On the one hand, there is a tendency towards cutting back the amount of it as a response to little public interest (Hoge, 1994: 143). But on the other, some media are "expanding their foreign coverage" (idem.). Either way, the attention that media gives to foreign news seems to be focused to "the unusual and the violent". "Film footage of violence is the element of foreign news most likely to leap the hurdles barring entry to the evening news shows' 22 precious minutes of airtime" (Hoge, 1993: 3). Bias against peaceful news is noted.

Jacobsen (2000) divides conflicts in three phases: pre-violence, violence and post-violence. His findings are that during the pre and post-violence coverage is negligible; "Since coverage of conflicts that might explode in violence is unlikely to boost ratings, these conflicts are usually ignored". In the post-violence phase coverage is also minimal, as an example of this, Jacobsen notes "Mine clearing is only news if Princess Diana is doing it". The coverage during the post-violence phase, however, tends towards the negative; failed projects, corruption, mismanagement, etc. The broad of coverage of a conflict, hence, happens during the violent phase, however, it is decided by "a host of different factors, most of which have nothing to do with humanitarian need such as: geographic proximity to Western countries, costs, logistics,

The individual level of international relations assumes that individuals can make a difference in the foreign policy process of a given state, that the governmental structure, as well as the processes of policy-

legal impediments (e.g. visa requirements), risk to journalists, relevance to national interest, and news attention cycles" (Jacobsen, 2000: 133).

Thus, foreign news may be concluded, are subject to coverage in relation to its level of violence and general news making and newsworthiness concerns. Girardet (1996) notes that there is a multiplicity of violent conflicts that have not received coverage at all. Conflicts are covered also in relation to their international implications, "It is doubtful that the media would have reported on Rwandans had it "just" been a case of Rwandans killing Rwandans". He explains the lack of coverage of violent conflicts comes from the need of the international community to justify concerns "by reacting to something more morally abhorrent than the mundane killing of ordinary human beings -just as Afghans killing Afghans, Sudanese killing Sudanese, or Angolans killing Angolans is apparently insufficient to mobilize more consistent coverage."

Girardet (1996) also points out that there is an obsession with the medium, rather than the purpose. The "technological conveniences" that news ICT's bring constitute a threat to quality journalism, since "All too often, information is confused with understanding, and high technology with journalism, so fascinated are the people by the vehicle rather than the purpose". The consequence is an obsession with immediacy, which shortens the journalist's "time to fully research and understand the issues at hand", encouraging "laziness and an over reliance on existent data".

Gowing (1994) believes that "There is far more real-time war than ever before" (81). Whatever is transmitted is determined by its graphic potential, "the main principle is: no pictures, then no serious coverage of a conflict" (idem.).

So far it is understood that foreign news is focused on conflicts; yet, only a few conflicts are covered, and such coverage is determined by a variety of factors independent to their level of humanitarian concerns, such as routine news making and newsworthiness considerations; the quality of the coverage, just as well, is influenced by the use of technologies at hand. However, what drives the attention of journalists in the first place towards a specific conflict? Hoge (1993: 2) believes that "the new media's task has been made more difficult by an absence of clear, steady cues from W
W c c

In short, the coverage of a foreign conflict is determined by a variety of factors sometimes tangential to the event itself. However, the quality of the coverage, and by this we mean the way reports are fashioned, is also subject of external determinants. News reports about humanitarian crises are claimed to move governments towards action as the CNN effect presumes, or to frame contents in conformity to executive or elitist interests, as suggested by the manufacturing consent theory.

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Foreign policy in Western democracies, as is the case of the United States, is drawn upon the idea of a predetermined national interest. With the end of the Cold-War the main concern of USA's national interest, stopping the spread of communism, was over, yet the challenge is now that of a new definition of national interests. As Hoge (1993: 2) describes, "there is not yet an articulated official framework for U.S. foreign policy in a still new post-Cold War world". The Cold War, Hoge (1994: 137) argues, provided a "gauge for determining the importance of events by how much they affected America's security versus its superpower rival". In other words, the Cold War provided Americans with a defined ideological stigmata, and this was revealed in the media: "The parameters of press coverage tended to be those of the country's foreign policy (...) The press was often critical, but of the execution of policy more than the aims." (Hoge, 1994: 137).

Joseph Nye (1999: 22) describes that the collapse of the Soviet Union challenges the way America conceives its national interests, since "'national interest' is a slippery concept, used to describe as well as prescribe foreign policy". Samuel P. Huntington argues that "without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests, and as a result sub national commercial interests and transnational and non national ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy" (quoted in Nye, 1999: 22)³.

Nye describes national interests in a democracy as follows: "national interest is simply the shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world" (1999: 23). Nye (1999) argues that policy making is more difficult today because of power complexities; he conceives power as a three dimensional chessboard: the first dimension is the military and it is unipolar, with the USA on top of the world; the second dimension is the economic, which is multipolar, with the USA, Europe and Japan having the biggest shares; the third dimension is that of transnational relations, with a dispersed structure of power. In conclusion, the USA "is preponderant, but not a dominant power" (Nye, 1999: 24). Therefore, the world did not exactly become unipolar after the Cold War; hence, national interests and foreign policies ought to take other variables into account, like the level of risk U.S. national security faces. Nye establishes three categories in the hierarchy of risks to U.S. national security. The "A" list constituted by threats to American survival (like the one the Soviet Union represented); the "B" list, constituted by imminent threats to U.S. interests (but not (but)-138(n(n po-31(mo1)-39(im)-onc)-5(e)4"ai(-10(in)5(e)4(sts230(the))-4(on,)-41(thAme)()-9(t)-

Nowadays, Nye (1999) argues, the "C" list predominates in the foreign policy agenda,

media on Western conflict management is negligible because coverage is limited to a small number of conflicts in the violence phase". The consequent shifting of funds from "cost effective, long-term measures to short-term relief efforts leading to a high ineffective allocation of resources" is the "invisible and indirect" impact that the media actually have on Western conflict management. This impact, he argues, "exceeds the direct impact generated by the CNN effect by far since the latter only affects a very small number of conflicts" (Jacobsen, 2000).

On the other hand, Livingston (1997)⁴ suggests a three-way typology of likely CNN effects. These are conditional on the kind of intervention that is being conducted, of which he recognizes eight types. The three CNN effects are described as follows:

First effect is media as accelerants, in this modality, media are presumed to shorten the time of decision-making response. Yet, the media can also become a "force multiplier", a "method of sending signals" to the opponent (1997: 2-4). This effect is most plausible to appear in conventional warfare, strategic deterrence, and tactical deterrence.

Second effect is media as impediment; this takes two forms, as an emotional inhibitor, and as a threat to operational security. One likely manifestation of the emotional inhibitor effect is the "Vietnam syndrome" (Livingston, 1997: 4), in which, it is presumed, public support is undermined by the media coverage of casualties. As a threat to operational security, the media are said to compromise the success of an operation by broadcasting it and, thus, revealing strategic information to the enemy, frustrating the success of the operation. This kind of effect, Livingston notes, is likely to appear during conventional warfare, tactical deterrence, SOLIC, peace making and peace keeping operations.

The **Third effect** of the media on foreign policy making that Livingston (1997) mentions is that

fact of the casualties, not the broadcasting of them that has an effect on policy (Luttwak, 1994; Hoge, 1994), since casualties are "unacceptable if suffered for no purpose" (Freedman, 2000)⁶.

When it comes to operational security, from a military point of view, Maj. Lafferty, et. al. (1994) finds that during a conflict, media reports increase enemy effectiveness, but only to a certain climatic point, after this, the effectiveness will start decreasing as an outcome of information overload; "Therefore, the U.S. Military must recast its relationship with media and pursue a strategy of information overload to decrease enemy effectiveness".

The ability of the media to function as an agenda setter is the most questioned by Livingston (1997) since the so-called CNN effect has been overestimated. "The majority of humanitarian operations are conducted without media attention (...). Furthermore, the eventual media

Livingston (1997: 9) suggests that when looking more closely to "post-Cold War U.S. "humanitarian" interventions, one is likely to find equally compelling geo-strategic reasons for

hypodermic needle theory taken to the sphere of policy making. On the other hand, the manufacturing consent theory implies some obscurity, even conspiracy behind the relationship between policy makers and the media. Not only does this imply that both media and audiences are passive entities, easy to manipulate, but also ignorant of the "reality" behind the framing and indexing of the coverage, since critical coverage is conceived only in cases of elite dissensus. Both these theories are in clear confrontation, and they invalidate each other. But as Robinson (2001) notes, the debate about effect vs. non-effect is unconstructive. Rather, new approaches towards understanding more clearly the relationship between media and foreign policy making are to be achieved.

Just as news media coverage is not limited to foreign events, foreign policy making is not limited to the foreign events covered by the media. Thus, it is not likely that the media could drive overall foreign policy for the mere fact that coverage is limited to a selected subset of events. However, it is likely that the media have the potential to lead towards the modification of the policies being conducted regarding the events covered. One way to explain this likely effect of the media on foreign policy is understanding it as a cycle of dialectic influence in which media reacts to policies and policy makers react to coverage in a continuum. In the long run, however, there is the possibility that dramatic changes would occur; yet the empirical evidence so far is that the policy makers' reaction to coverage of humanitarian crises is usually that of emergency relief. The perceived impact of the media is inextricably related to policy certainty, the greater the certainty the lesser the impact of the media. This points out other indirect effects of the media, such as those detailed by Jacobsen (2000) and Nye (1999).

The main conclusion of this paper is that news media and foreign policy making process influence one another, sometimes directly, others indirectly.

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Excerpt: “Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the Concept of Selective Exposure”

Natalie Stroud

Polit Behavior Vol. 30 No 1. 1

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Abstract

Today, people have ample opportunity to engage in selective exposure, the selection of information matching their beliefs. Whether this is occurring, however, is a matter of debate. While some worry that people increasingly are seeking out likeminded views, others propose that newer media provide an increased opportunity for exposure to diverse views. In returning to the concept of selective exposure, this article argues that certain topics, such as politics, are more likely to inspire selective exposure and that research should investigate habitual media exposure patterns, as opposed to single exposure decisions. This study investigates whether different media types (newspapers, political talk radio, cable news, and Internet) are more likely to inspire selective exposure. Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, evidence supports the idea that people’s political beliefs are related to their media exposure—a pattern that persists across media types. Over-time analyses suggest that people’s political beliefs motivate their media use patterns and that cable news audiences became increasingly politically divided over the course of the 2004 election.

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In the summer of 2003, questions about the situation in Iraq abounded: Where were the weapons of mass destruction? Was there a link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda? Though facts do not favor either of these contentious explanations for the invasion of Iraq, beliefs that Hussein had weapons and that he was linked to Al

Qaeda existed. Intriguingly, some Americans were more likely to express these beliefs than others. In particular, those viewing FOX news were more likely to believe in both the link and the weapons while those watching PBS and listening to NPR were less likely (Kull et al. 2003-4). The implications of this finding are troubling: Different patterns of news exposure may lead people to develop different impressions of what is happening in the world around them. Without a shared base of information, it is difficult to imagine citizens agreeing on matters of public policy and it is easy to envision citizens developing highly polarized attitudes toward political matters. As media exposure predicts both beliefs and attitudes, the question emerges: what predicts media exposure?

One possible answer is that people engage in selective exposure, the selection of media outlets that match their beliefs and predispositions. The concept of selective exposure is not new—research on the topic surged in the 1960s and then declined in subsequent decades following influential reviews of the literature that did not support the phenomenon (Freedman and Sears 1965; Sears and Freedman 1967). Given changes in the contemporary media environment, however, it is important to return to the study of selective exposure. Today, it is far easier to engage in se

exposure to the outlet, one would be at an impasse. Some beliefs, therefore, must be more likely to guide exposure decisions compared to other beliefs.

One possibility is that personally relevant beliefs, those beliefs related to a person's interests or self-identity, are more likely to influence exposure decisions (Donsbach 1991). If one cared little about politics, for example, s/he would have little motivation to seek out congenial media. From a cognitive perspective, personally relevant beliefs are more readily activated from memory and hence, are more likely to guide our thoughts – and, as advanced here, our media selections. As Price and Tewksbury (1997) explain, certain constructs are chronically accessible—irrespective of the situation, they are more likely to be used as a basis for processing information. They note that Chronic accessibility may come from a variety of sources....One example would be the degree to which a given construct is linked with a person's self-concept (p. 190). Political partisanship represents one such construct (Green et al. 2002; Lau 1989). In contrast to other topics, those with strong political leanings may be particularly likely to engage in selective exposure because their political beliefs are accessible and personally relevant. The second possibility is that topics and beliefs inspiring an affective response may stimulate patterns of selectivity. People may adjust their exposure to political information in order to obtain or maintain a desired emotional state or as a response to a distinct emotion (Valentino et al. 2007). Taber and Lodge (2006), for example, propose that when stimuli elicit an affective response, strong partisans on an issue are more likely to engage in selective exposure (and motivated reasoning) in response to the stimuli. For some scholars, politics often yields an affective response (e.g. Marcus et al. 2000). In particular, those with strongly held political beliefs may avoid media outlets producing negative affect and approach media outlets producing positive affect. In sum, selective exposure may be contingent on the personal relevance of the topic and whether it generates an affective response. For those with strong political predispositions, therefore, political topics may be particularly likely to inspire selective exposure (Lowin 1967; Sears and Freedman 1967). Accordingly, this study tests the following hypothesis concerning partisan selective exposure:

H1 People with more strongly held political predispositions will be more likely to select politically congenial media outlets.

Selective Exposure and Time

It also is important to revisit the topic of selective exposure with new evidence because past research has tended to focus on people's exposure decisions in a single instance—exposure to a movie (Ball-

Many of these studies, however, rely on cross-sectional data without the presence of controls, and so they fall short of documenting causal relationships between people's beliefs and their media consumption (Freedman and Sears 1965; Sears and Freedman 1967). Furthermore, most studies have examined selective exposure for a single media type (e.g. cable news station or talk radio program) at a single point in time, instead of more comprehensively considering people's media consumption patterns.

This study aims to measure changes in people's more habitual media exposure patterns. During the course of a presidential campaign, for example, the public may become increasingly aware of the media outlets corresponding to their political predispositions and may switch to more congenial sources. Research documents that politics is more salient to people during presidential elections (Weaver et al. 1981). In an environment where politics and partisanship are emphasized, partisan selective exposure is likely to be enhanced. To evaluate whether selective exposure increases in the short-term as partisan conflict becomes more heated, Hypothesis 2 will be investigated.

H2 Partisan selective exposure will increase during the course of a presidential campaign.

Selective Exposure and Media Type

Though use of television and radio for gathering political information has remained fairly constant since 1992, people's news media patterns are changing. Specifically, people are moving away from newspapers as a source of political information and toward the Internet (Rainie and Horrigan 2007). Given these shifts, it is important to understand whether patterns of selective exposure differ across media types. If so, we may anticipate changes in aggregate levels of partisan selective exposure over time as people's media consumption patterns change.

The Internet, in particular, provides people with ample opportunities to encounter information that either complements or contradicts their political predispositions. In embracing this freedom of choice, it is an open question whether people will seek out likeminded or opinion-challenging online content. On the one hand, it is possible that people will use the Internet to fragment into ever more specific likeminded groups (Sunstein 2001). Indeed, visitors to the Gore and Bush websites in 2000 tended to share the political outlook advanced by the website (Bimber and Davis 2003). On the other hand, people may use the Internet to explore diverse opinions. In a series of in-depth interviews, Stromer-Galley (2003) found that people discussing politics online tended not to mention that they purposefully sought out likeminded others. Instead, they said that they enjoyed hearing diverse views. Further, Horrigan et al. (2004) concluded that Internet users did not avoid counter-attitudinal partisan messages online. Whether the Internet inspires different patterns of selective exposure in comparison to radio, cable television, and newspapers obviously warrants further research.

In contrast to the Internet (e)-3(a)e

exposure. It is possible that because cable news networks are widely available (in contrast to diverse newspapers) and identify as objective outlets (in contrast to some talk radio programs and Internet websites), people are more likely to select a cable news network based on their political beliefs. Third, this finding may be a measurement artifact. Recall that cable news exposure was the only partisan media variable that did not require the construction of a classification system for many different outlets. The use of classification systems and coding schemes to identify outlets as liberal and conservative, as was done when evaluating the partisanship of websites and radio programs, undoubtedly leads to some measurement error. Further, newspaper endorsements may not be a perfect indicator of the political leanings of the

relationship. Third, the measures of media exposure impose some limitations. The Internet question, for example, did not ask respondents who ventured to candidate websites whether they visited only one or multiple candidate sites. This may lead to an underestimation of the extent of partisan selective exposure. Further, the cable news question asked respondents about their most watched station, not about all stations that they watched. Given that the media measures have various limitations, it is instructive to note the consistency of the relationship between media consumption and political leanings.

Despite these limitations, this study makes a number of contributions to the literature. The results

Narco tráfico, crimen organizado y seguridad

“International Counternarcotics Policies: Do They Reduce Domestic Consumption or Advance Other Foreign Policy Goals”

David T. Johnson

Statement before the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Domestic Policy

Washington, DC.

July 21, 2010

Chairman Kucinich, Ranking Member Jordan, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify about the State Department’s role in counternarcotics and criminal justice sector reform efforts around the globe. It is my pleasure to be here today on behalf of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), I oversee the Department’s foreign assistance programs that help our international partners strengthen their own criminal justice sectors and their capacity to provide their own citizens with security under the rule of law. Many of our programs are relevant to the topic of this hearing, as our assistance efforts help foreign governments to curtail illicit crime such as narcotics production and trafficking, and develop the capacity to govern justly.

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several counternarcotics programs we helped to develop to Colombian control. Most important, public security has improved enormously over the past decade.

All of this real success does not, however, mean that the job in Colombia is done or that there are not serious challenges remaining. As Secretary Clinton has noted, due to the continued high rate

that before alternative development and justice programs can make a difference, security must also be established. Once a permanent government security presence is in place, a comprehensive assistance program that includes counternarcotics, rule of law and economic development, has proven successful in making these achievements more durable.

Peru -

both of which are critical to Mexico's developing narcotics search and seizure operations along our shared border. Each of INL's assistance programs in Mexico responds to specific requirements defined within letters of agreement between our two countries for each fiscal year, which ensures that we are both striving toward shared programmatic objectives and a shared understanding of the timing for program implementation.

Through FY09, \$982 million of Merida Initiative Internationa

esprit de corps, enhancing management skills and integrating offices of professional responsibility and/or internal affairs, into each and every justice institution. To prevent corrupt police from being hired in another state or municipality, the government has developed a National Police Registry, which will include advanced biometric technology. In the Attorney General's office, or PGR, the Government of Mexico has developed a modern, computerized case management system with sophisticated checks and balances to make it much more difficult for prosecutors to lose case files, or improperly influence a case. The system is to be online and operational across most parts of the country in 2011, with country-wide operability in 2012.

The Government of Mexico is now targeting entire criminal organizations, from drivers to financiers, and hit-men to middle-managers. The joint U.S. Government-Government of Mexico High Value Target List is an important element, but is not the only focus. The United States is supporting Mexico's specialized units with training, equipment, and technical advice. We are working on complex money laundering investigations, asset forfeiture issues and weapons trafficking. We are building mechanisms to share information vital to the investigation and arrest of Mexican criminals. U.S. assistance has also successfully expanded Plataforma Mexico, which provides sophisticated information technology equipment to law enforcement entities, and contributes equipment to enhance the security of law enforcement and judicial officials throughout Mexico. Finally, the record number of extraditions from Mexico to the United States during the last three years has demonstrated Mexico's efforts to bring serious violent offenders to justice.

The State Department is also helping Mexico build strong and effective institutions to sustain the rule of law and protect human rights. The United States is supporting Mexico's reform of its criminal justice sector – from the police, to prosecutors, customs, corrections and the judiciary. For example, U.S. Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers were instrumental in training over 4,300 new Federal Police investigators in investigative techniques, including securing a crime scene, interviewing suspects and witnesses, surveillance, evidence collection, and testifying in oral trials. We are providing expertise and funding for prosecutorial training in all 31 Mexican states and the federal district this year, focusing on the new judicial reforms. We are currently working with Mexican Customs to provide assistance for their new academy, and we have provided training for law enforcement K-9 programs and their handlers. In one of the more innovative programs, we are working with the U.S. states of Colorado and New Mexico to provide training and technical assistance for corrections officers, not only from Mexico, but also from Central America. We are working with the Government of Mexico now to determine how best to engage with their State and local institutions. We know that State and local entities are key to the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of our cooperative justice sector reform efforts in Mexico.

The State Department is also committed to helping Mexico improve and develop its border security capabilities, improving and modernizing their inspection efforts in line with 21st century practices. The U.S. and Mexican governments have launched a range of initiatives that challenge the traditional view and are developing a framework for a new vision of 21st century border management. In the short term, U.S. assistance is contributing non-intrusive inspection equipment and K-9 programs to detect drugs and other contraband moving north, and guns and cash moving south. The State Department is working with a number of interagency colleagues to

help build new capabilities within Mexico's border forces, as well as enhance our information sharing and better coordinate our operations on the U.S. side of the border.

Finally, we are working to build strong and resilient communities in Mexico. We know that communities are key to deterring the influence of criminal organizations, whether through anonymous tips, socio-economic alternatives, or educational opportunities. State Department assistance in this area will help build a culture of lawfulness through continued engagement and education with schools, the media, law enforcement officials and civil society. Our assistance will also be expanded to devote increased resources to the prevention and treatment of substance use and its consequences – goals reflected in our National Drug Control Strategy. This year, the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the Department of State hosted a delegation from Mexico at a Bi-national Demand reduction conference to share information and develop next steps for reducing illicit drug consumption on both sides of our shared border – consumption that is fueling the violence. The State Department is also working closely with the Government of Mexico to enhance tip lines and emergency call centers so that the police will be more accountable and responsive to the communities they serve and foster greater public confidence.

We have also agreed with the Government of Mexico to work together in several of the most affected Mexican communities, like Ciudad Juarez. In February and June, our governments held bilateral planning sessions to discuss options for improving the situation in Juarez. Our discussions spanned various topics including: 1) improving information collection and analysis and using it to lead law enforcement operations and investigations; 2) developing law enforcement task forces to best utilize resources for patrols, investigations, and visible policing; 3) promoting enhanced cooperation in investigations between Federal, State, and local police officers and the military; 4) augmenting expert prosecutors in Juarez and developing procedures for cooperation between Federal and State prosecutions; 5) developing standard procedures for securing a crime scene and collecting evidence; 6) elaborating a plan for safe, secure and humane detention facilities; and 7) establishing procedures to vet active state and local police officers and weed out corrupt actors.

We are working closely with Mexican officials to direct U.S. assistance where it can best be applied in Juarez. The range of assistance being offered includes: measures to reform State and local police, internal controls, assistance to prosecutors and judges, corrections training, equipment, including complex IT and communications equipment, as well as technical assistance and advice on running task forces, sharing information, and developing actionable law enforcement information. Because Chihuahua has already converted to an accusatory system, State police and judicial officials in Juarez begin their work with a presumption of innocence, and are relying on evidence for their cases, while Federal officials, including a recently-deployed cadre of SSP officers are still working in the old inquisitorial system. These examples do not prohibit work in Juarez, but they do provide a sense of how complex the situation is and how there are conflicting systems that require time-consuming coordination.

Afghanistan - On the other side of the world, the United States has been taking steps to counter a very different drug threat. Like Colombia, Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of an illegal set of drugs; in this case opiates. Unlike Colombia, most of these drugs do not come to the United States but either remain in the region or go to Europe, Russia, China, the Middle East or

West Africa. However, the drug trade poses a threat to Coalition efforts to stabilize the region and Afghanistan itself. Funding from the drug trade supports the Taliban other insurgent groups trying to overthrow the Afghan government. It also fuels the extensive corruption that undermines the ability of the Government of Afghanistan to provide security, expand development, and strengthen the rule of law.

To ensure a comprehensive and coordinated approach to the drug problem in Afghanistan, we are currently working with our interagency and international partners to target narcotics traffickers and drug lords – especially those with ties to the insurgency – and enhance the government's focus on agriculture, interdiction, demand reduction, public information, and rule of law. All of our efforts aim to connect the Afghan people to effective government institutions, build the capacity of central and provincial authorities, provide legal alternatives to poppy, and target – and dismantle – the very intersection where corruption, insurgency, and narcotics threaten the progress of Afghanistan, its neighbors, and the United States.

Central Asia - Most of the opiates produced in Afghanistan pass through Iran and Pakistan en

that Colombian cartels have branched out and are now operating on the ground in some West African states. This creates an additional source of income that strengthens the mother organizations back in South America.

The State Department led interagency assessments throughout the region. AFRICOM, DEA, and other USG agencies participate. These have been a valuable source of information on how narco-trafficking is affecting West African countries, the capability and will of regional governments to confront narco-trafficking, and the steps our international partners are taking to address the problem. Our goals in the region are to create an inhospitable operating environment for international drug trafficking organizations by strengthening host nation criminal justice institutions and to improve West African counterdrug cooperation with the United States. Since some EU states are also stepping up their activities there, Department coordination with the EU promotes mutually reinforcing programs.

Demand Reduction

Thus far, my remarks have focused on supply reduction, programs and initiatives to attack and disrupt organizations and the supply train at various points in the process and to change the economic environment that encourages drug production. The State Department also has programs to help foreign governments reduce their own domestic demand for drugs, an increasing problem for many societies that previously regarded themselves as largely immune to drug abuse. This includes many developing countries, some of which now have the highest rates

The State Department makes use of a broad range of tools to attack transnational drug and other criminal enterprises. Our primary focus is on improving the criminal justice sectors – police, prosecutors, courts, and administration – of foreign governments so that they can confront such threats directly on their home turf and before they reach our borders. In key drug source countries, this also includes support for drug crop elimination and assistance programs to wean farmers away from drug crops. By modernizing police methods and criminal laws, we also improve the ability of partner governments to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement agencies at the operational and prosecutorial level.

“Dirty Money: How to Break the Link Between Organized Crime and Politics”
Kevin Casas

humans require oxygen. While not unique to Latin America, these challenges manifest themselves in the region with uncommon intensity.

been investigated for ties to paramilitary groups. Penetration of violent criminal gangs is even more pervasive at the local level.

Weak System Parties

The weakness of parties and party systems throughout the region also has troubling financial implications. The dearth of fee-paying party members and the modest amounts available to candidates from most systems of public election funding in Latin America leave parties and their candidates heavily dependent on their ability to attract private contributors.

The weak party systems in many Latin American countries also make them particularly prone to the emergence of political outsiders who are supported by little more than a well-funded electoral

goal of achieving impunity from any of their crimes and thus undercuts the rule of law. This is a crucial difference between organized crime and any other interest group. Legitimate interests that contribute to campaigns seek to shape the law in their favor. Organized crime seeks to prevent the law from being enforced altogether—and this strikes at the heart of the viability of the state.

Campaign contributions from organized crime enhance the power and influence of actors who, in many cases, actively dispute the state's sovereign control over a territory, as Colombians and Mexicans know well. They nurture a power that exists not through the law, but outside it. In the worst cases of political penetration by organized crime, the distinction between institutions and crime—between inside and outside the law—dissolves as the state and its authorities become effective abettors of criminal activities, and may even depend on such activities to function.¹⁷

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“South America: Framing Regional Security”

John Chipman & James Lockhart Smith

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Summits rarely make for exciting television viewing, but the meeting in August 2009 of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) in Argentina, convening all heads of state of the organisation, came close. Unasur, uniting 12 South American states into a single institution, had been created in 2008 after several years of negotiation.¹ Originally envisaged as a continental organisation bringing together the region's trade blocs, as from March 2008 it has begun to be used as a forum for regional security management, especially in the Andes. The August 2009 meeting had been called to discuss the controversy surrounding an agreement by which Colombia was to allow the United States access to seven facilities and bases on its soil.² Presidents Alvaro Uribe of Colombia and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, the main parties to the heated regional argument, claimed equal but differing threats to their national and personal security, and expressed opposite views of the US role. Uribe had the previous month leaked information implying that President Chávez continued to assist Colombian insurgents to buy shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles to be used to bring down the presidential plane³, and now spoke harshly of Chávez's affection for them; Chávez referred, in turn, to a plot for his assassination hatched between members of his own opposition and Colombian paramilitaries⁴, and presented an obscure US Air Force White Paper as allegedly disquieting evidence of US imperialism.⁵ President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Unasur's principal promoter, elicited at the summit a final collective declaration that made token references to drug trafficking and other non-state threats, and promised to build sovereignty-respecting trust in matters of defence and security, but principally warned against the destabilising effects of the presence of foreign military forces.⁶ The live coverage of the event, on which Uribe had insisted as a

¹ Unasur comprises Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.

² The two countries signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement on 30 October 2009, which will facilitate effective bilateral cooperation on security matters in Colombia, including narcotics production and trafficking, terrorism, illicit smuggling of all

guarantee of transparency and insurance against excessive verbal aggression by his Venezuelan counterpart, in the event served to infect this new regional security institution with the familiar and unproductive rhetoric of megaphone diplomacy. Leaders took turns striking poses for their respective electorates rather than talking to each other and solving issues, in the process presenting distorted vignettes of strategic reality. The summit showed the difficulties in building an effective regional security institution from the top down and revealed the need for Unasur to

is still no more than embryonic. The enduring desire to hold successful summits rather than

motivated citizenship programmes not only to give refuge to FARC insurgents but also to bolster his own electoral support base.¹²

delivering the necessary volumes of gas after it had issued the nationalization decree, but the tension at the time was significant. The obvious influence of Venezuelan President Chávez and Venezuelan resources in Morales's original decision to nationalise his gas reserves also generated tensions between Brazil and Venezuela.

Energy-security vulnerabilities are additionally driven by competition for limited resources. Chile can supply with its own resources only 5% of the oil and 20% of the natural gas it needs, and has largely been dependent on Argentine imports of natural gas. In 2002, however, economic crisis and domestic energy shortages drove the Argentine government to cut off gas supplies to Chile. Similarly, Bolivian gas has also generated tensions not just between Bolivia and Brazil but also between Brazil and Argentina as its two main consumers. As the dispute between Bolivia and Brazil unfolded, Brazil also saw the stability of gas imports from Bolivia threatened by rising demand from Argentina, and in particular Argentina's agreement to pay Bolivia more for its gas. These tensions were mitigated in 2008 and 2009 by falling Brazilian demand for natural gas, the increasing role of liquefied natural gas production and imports across the region, and in the long term by Brazil's discovery of its own gas reserves. However, given the scale of the resource challenges that South America will face over the coming decades, these kinds of disputes could become typical.

Lastly, energy-security problems are in some cases caused by the deliberate use of export restrictions as a policy weapon, usually as part of a wider conflict. This has occurred with Bolivia and Chile. Because of its grievance over Chile's refusal to grant it access to the Pacific, Bolivia has steadily refused to export any of its natural gas at all to Chile. In 2003, moreover, the Bolivian government, in response to domestic discontent, withdrew a planned gas plant on the coast of Chile that had been intended to supply the United States. The next year a referendum was passed in which Bolivians were invited to vote in favour of using natural gas as a negotiating tool to get Chile to grant access to the sea. In the same way, Peru also withheld natural gas from Chile prior to the arrival in office of the second Alan García administration, also for reasons of territorial grievance.

Outside powers

Many of the current crop of Latin American leaders spent their formative years under the shadow of frequent US intervention, and this history goes some way to explaining the extreme political sensitivity of the US–Colombia agreement. Conversely, the nascent relationships of other Latin American countries, particularly Venezuela, with foreign powers such as Russia and Iran are viewed suspiciously in Washington. Extra-regional powers often behave according to clear geopolitical calculations, which are primarily but not entirely resource oriented. Yet, diplomatic, economic and military interests of outside powers in Latin America do not yet pose the sort of geopolitical challenge that should be a priority for defence policy or the sizing of armed forces. The need for the region to defend against an external threat, or to preserve its integrity against the competitive diplomacy of two or more mutually hostile great powers, is not there. Cold War thinking about Latin American international relations is inappropriate, for now.

This is most obvious in the case of the United States, the relevance of which as a determinant of change within Latin America is in secular decline. The United States under President Barack

Obama,

The same broad principles on greater engagement hold true for China. Like Russia, it has so far

controversially, Venezuela's relationships with countries such as Russia, Iran and China are not just a way of ruffling the feathers of the US hawk but, as for some of Venezuela's allies, are an increasingly important source of investment and military resources. Since 2005 Chávez has spent \$6.6bn of funds or credit on Russian weapons, mostly for offensive conventional warfare, procuring 92 T-

international relations from beneath, but multilateral institutions must work to do so from above. South America suffers from a volatile mix of domestic instability and democratic lacunae, transnational security problems that from their very nature disrespect national borders and generate conflict wherever they fail to elicit cooperation, conflicts of interest between governments over territory and resources, and the lucrative but potentially problematic geopolitical influence of a range of extra-regional powers. Unasur should seek to mitigate all of these.

Experiences elsewhere suggest some key targets for the institution to meet. Where containment of conflict has been effective, it has been because efforts in regional political reconciliation have been successful, there is an acceptable level of transparency on military and strategic goals of the key countries, outside powers have played a constructive role with sufficient regional consent, the larger regional powers adopt greater regional responsibility for the enforcement of agreed norms, and institutions exist that can provide legitimacy to conflict-resolution measures taken either individually or collectively. Progress along each of these fronts is necessary for South America to achieve a higher level of security confidence. In achieving this progress, the region will wish to note the increasing interest of a variety of outside powers in South American affairs, and its o

ASEAN is perhaps the most successful regional organisation after the EU. However, even after

challenges and the norms that should govern their management. Only in this way will the region move towards a common strategic culture and Unasur's ambitious construction of South America as a 'zone of peace'. If such a process were successful, it could later be extended to Central American states and Mexico. For the immediate future the South American Defence Council needs directly to address domestic, transnational, regional and international concerns with a specific agenda.

To avoid the hijacking of Unasur for esoteric diplomatic purposes and its manipulation for short-term ends, the Defence Council should develop a rich and ritualised agenda of activity to foster transparency, build a common strategic culture and elaborate principles for the management of disputes. Emphasis on external security will from time to time be necessary, but should not take permanent precedence over developing better cooperation on continental security dilemmas. In an era when military expenditure is increasing, in some cases simply because improved economic fortunes permit modernisation, in others because the adoption of peacekeeping missions requires adjustments in force structures, and in a few because expansionist policies are perhaps contemplated, the overall impact of a renewed Defence Council agenda must be to shine a clear light on strategic activity. Given the tensions and suspicions that exist, the following agenda would serve that end.

The council should openly discuss the manner in which sovereign territory is used by non-state

future Unasur summit will make a less interesting televised spectacle, but record more obvious

“Informe Mundial Sobre Las Drogas 2010: Resumen Ejecutivo.”

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23 de junio de 2010

En 1998, en uno de los períodos extraordinarios de sesiones de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, se adoptó la decisión de trabajar en aras de la eliminación o reducción significativa de la producción ilícita y el uso indebido de drogas para 2008, y se aprobaron varios planes sectoriales para alcanzar ese objetivo¹. Una vez transcurridos esos diez años, los Estados Miembros mostraron su insatisfacción por los resultados obtenidos, y manifestaron que seguían estando sumamente preocupados por la creciente amenaza que plantea el problema mundial de las drogas². Se adoptó la decisión de proseguir la labor durante la década siguiente.

¿Es factible eliminar o reducir de forma significativa toda la oferta y demanda de drogas para 2019, como piden los Estados Miembros? En el plano nacional, cabe esperar que muchos países puedan mejorar considerablemente sus medidas de fiscalización de drogas en un decenio. ¿Se traducirá este éxito a nivel local en una mejora general a escala mundial?

En relación con la fiscalización de drogas la experiencia ha venido demostrando que la mera suma de esfuerzos no coordinados en los planos nacional y sectorial, incluidos los que han tenido éxito, no comporta éxito en el plano internacional. Asimismo, los países con recursos limitados

estadística proporcionada también se basa, si procede, en otras fuentes, su fuente principal es el cuestionario para los informes anuales y los estudios sobre cultivos ilícitos que elabora la UNODC en cooperación con los Estados Miembros.

Por último, se incluye un capítulo relativo a un asunto que genera una creciente inquietud en la comunidad internacional: la relación entre el tráfico de drogas y la inestabilidad. Dicho capítulo se centra en las repercusiones del comercio de la droga en los grados de violencia y corrupción en los países de tránsito, en particular en América Latina, la región del Caribe y África occidental.

No obstante, este resumen no está estructurado según el informe. Para mayor claridad, se presenta en primer lugar una reseña general de los cambios en los mercados mundiales de la droga. A continuación figura un examen integrado de esos mercados, incluidos el análisis a nivel de mercado y los datos sobre las tendencias. Por último, se resume el estudio de las repercusiones del tráfico de drogas en los países de tránsito.

Evolución de la producción, el tráfico y el consumo de drogas ilícitas a nivel mundial

Producción

Recientemente han tenido lugar varios avances alentadores en relación con los mercados de la cocaína y la heroína a nivel mundial:

- La superficie total dedicada al cultivo de adormidera se redujo a 181.400 hectáreas (hectáreas) en 2009 (15%), es decir, en un 23% desde 2007.
- Análogamente dicha reducción de la superficie de cultivo, la producción mundial de opio

embargo, de ello puede inferirse que aunque se erradicara por completo la producción hoy en día, esas reservas podrían satisfacer la demanda de los consumidores al menos durante dos años.

El aumento de la producción potencial de cocaína a nivel mundial en el period 1998-2008 parece haber sido más moderado (5%), de 825 a 865 toneladas métricas, si bien persiste la incertidumbre en cuanto al rendimiento de la coca y la eficiencia de su producción. No obstante,

Las incautaciones a nivel mundial de hierba de cannabis aumentaron en el periodo 2006-2008 (+23%), en particular en América del Sur, y alcanzaron niveles análogos a los de 2004. Las incautaciones mundiales de resina de cannabis aumentaron notablemente en el período 2006-2008 (+62%), y su volumen superó con creces el último máximo registrado en 2004. Se ha informado de un aumento importante de incautaciones de resina de cannabis en 2008 en el Cercano y Medio Oriente, así como en Europa y África.

Consumo

La UNODC estima que entre 155 y 250 millones de personas en todo el mundo (3,5 a 5,7% de la población entre 15 y 64 años de edad) consumieron sustancias ilícitas en 2008. A nivel mundial, los consumidores de cannabis constituyen el principal grupo de consumidores de drogas ilícitas (entre 129 y 190 millones de personas). Le siguió en volumen de consumo el de sustancias del grupo de las anfetaminas y a continuación la cocaína y los opiáceos.

En el epicentro del consumo de drogas se encuentran los consumidores problemáticos, es decir, aquellos que se las inyectan o son considerados drogodependientes, quienes en consecuencia sufren graves repercusiones de índole social y sanitaria. Sobre la base de estimaciones del número de consumidores de cannabis, opiáceos, cocaína y ETA a nivel mundial, se calcula que en 2008 había de 16 a 38 millones de consumidores problemáticos en el mundo. Ello corresponde a una proporción de entre el 10 y el 15% de todas las personas que consumieron drogas ese año. En el plano mundial, se calcula que durante el último año, entre el 12% y el 30% de los consumidores problemáticos recibieron tratamiento, lo que supone que entre 11 y 33,5 millones de consumidores problemáticos no recibió tratamiento ese año.

La falta de datos en muchos países sigue limitando la comprensión del problema del consumo de drogas en un gran número de ellos, especialmente en África, algunas partes de Asia y las islas del Pacífico. La amplitud de la gama de estimaciones refleja la incertidumbre de los datos disponibles a nivel mundial.

Los datos relativos a los servicios de tratamiento dirigidos a los consumidores de drogas problemáticos pueden proporcionar valiosa información sobre la manera en que los problemas derivados del consumo de drogas varían entre regiones. La proporción de los servicios de tratamiento a los consumidores de distintas drogas varía considerablemente de una región a otra. En Europa y Asia, la mayoría de los tratamientos solicitados corresponden a los opiáceos. En América, a la cocaína, y en África y Oceanía, al cannabis. Esas proporciones han cambiando con el tiempo. Respecto del decenio anterior, el número de tratamientos relativos al cannabis ha aumentado en Europa, América del Sur y Oceanía, lo que indica que una proporción mayor del consumo de cannabis puede llegar a ser problemática. En el mismo período de tiempo, la demanda de tratamientos en relación con la cocaína ha disminuido en América, en particular en América del Norte, en tanto que en Europa ha aumentado. Por el contrario, la importancia relativa de los opiáceos en cuanto al tratamiento de drogas ha disminuido en Europa, Asia y (en particular) Oceanía, si bien ha aumentado en África. La proporción de solicitudes de tratamiento en relación con los ETA a escala mundial es cada vez mayor.

Las estimaciones sobre el tamaño de los grupos de consumidores en diversas partes del mundo se basan en encuestas por hogares y escuelas, y en métodos indirectos. Lamentablemente, en la mayoría de los países las encuestas basadas en la población son esporádicas, por lo que siguen existiendo importantes lagunas en los datos relativos al alcance del consumo de drogas en determinadas partes del mundo.

El cannabis continúa siendo la droga más consumida en el mundo. La prevalencia anual de su consumo a nivel mundial oscila entre el 2,9 y el 4,3% de la población de entre 15 y 64 años de edad. La prevalencia más alta corresponde a Oceanía (del 9,3 al 14,8%), seguido de América (del 6,3 al 6,6%). Se calcula que el número de consumidores anuales de cocaína en el mundo oscila entre 15 y 19,3 millones (prevalencia anual del 0,3 al 0,4%). Las regiones con mayor índice de prevalencia son América del Norte (2%), Oceanía (del 1,4 al 1,7%) y Europa occidental (1,5%). De 12,8 a 21,8 millones de personas (del 0,3 al 0,5% de la población mundial de edad comprendida entre 15 y 64 años) consumió opiáceos en 2008. Más de la mitad de los consumidores de opiáceos del mundo se encuentran en Asia. La UNODC estima que entre 13,7 y 52,9 millones de personas entre 15 y 64 años de edad han consumido alguna sustancia de tipo anfetamínico en el último año (entre el 0,3 y el 1,2% de la población), incluidos los consumidores de éxtasis, cuya cifra oscila entre 10,5 y 25,8 millones (entre el 0,2 y el 0,6% de la población). Oceanía, el Asia oriental y el Asia sudoriental, América del Norte, Europa occidental y Europa central son las regiones que registran mayores índices de prevalencia de consumo de ETA.

Además de las drogas mencionadas anteriormente, el uso indebido de medicamentos que requieren receta médica, como los opioides sintéticos, las benzodiazepinas o los estimulantes sintéticos recetados, es un problema sanitario creciente en algunos países desarrollados y en desarrollo.

Los principales mercados de la droga

Actualmente, los mercados ilícitos de opiáceos y cocaína a nivel mundial son dos de las amenazas transnacionales más graves derivadas de la droga y el delito. Siguen siendo al parecer problemas legados por la fiscalización de drogas del pasado, esferas de intervención prioritarias por la gravedad de sus repercusiones sociales en las comunidades afectadas, y buenas razones para llegar a una solución a nivel internacional en un plazo razonable. Puesto que el origen de ambos problemas son zonas de producción relativamente concentradas, la mayoría de sus componentes están vinculados entre sí directa o indirectamente.

Además, los estimulantes de tipo anfetamínico han acaparado una gran proporción del mercado de drogas a nivel mundial en los últimos dos decenios, pasando a ser una nueva e importante amenaza para la fiscalización de drogas tanto en el presente como en el futuro. Desde 1990, la producción de ETA se ha extendido y, hasta la fecha, más de una tercera parte de los Estados Miembros han informado de actividades relacionadas con esa producción. Asimismo, se prevé que el número de consumidores de ETA a nivel mundial supere al de los consumidores de opiáceos y cocaína en su conjunto.

Cocaína

corresponde el 70% de la demanda mundial y el 85% del valor total de mercado, son cada vez más importantes en la conformación de la evolución del mercado de cocaína mundial. América del Sur, América Central y la región del Caribe cuentan con otros 2,7 millones de consumidores.

El mercado más grande de cocaína: América del Norte

La región de América del Norte es el mayor mercado de cocaína del mundo, y le corresponde casi el 40% de los consumidores de esa droga a nivel mundial. Los datos parecen indicar que, en 2008, se necesitaron 196 toneladas métricas de cocaína pura para satisfacer la demanda en esa región. Para poder surtir esa cantidad a los consumidores (teniendo en cuenta las incautaciones, el consumo en los países de tránsito y la pureza), había sido necesario despachar más de 309 toneladas métricas de la región andina en dirección norte en ese año. Esa cantidad supone casi la mitad de la cocaína originaria de dicha región, cantidad menor a la de hace algunos años. Sobre la base de análisis forenses de la cocaína incautada en los Estados Unidos, se deduce que la mayor parte de ese tipo de droga consumida en América del Norte fue producida en Colombia.

El mercado de la cocaína en América del Norte parece estar reduciéndose. Las encuestas por

sigue aumentando, se estima que el consumo de cocaína en Europa en 2008 fue de 124 toneladas métricas. Se calcula que para satisfacer esa demanda se transportaron 212 toneladas de América del Sur a Europa, es decir casi una cuarta parte de la producción total. Una proporción mayor de esa cantidad procede del Perú y del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, a diferencia de los Estados Unidos.

Los principales países de ingreso al mercado europeo son España y los Países Bajos. La mayor parte del tráfico se realiza por vía marítima. Existen importantes rutas de tránsito entre las antiguas colonias o los territorios de ultramar de varios países europeos y sus homólogos en el continente. Al parecer, los flujos a través del África occidental han disminuido desde 2007, pero podrían reanudarse en un futuro próximo.

precursores de la heroína en ese país (del anhídrido acético en particular) y la acumulación de reservas de opio no transformado en heroína.

Si bien la producción de la mayor parte de los opiáceos ilícitos del mundo tiene lugar en el Afganistán (6.900 toneladas métricas de opio, lo que correspondió al 89% de la producción mundial en 2009), también se producen cantidades importantes en Myanmar (330 toneladas métricas) y en América Latina (sobre todo en México y en Colombia). Desde 2003, México es el tercer productor más importante de opio a nivel mundial, y con un volumen en 2008 (325 toneladas métricas) muy parecido al de Myanmar en 2009.

Parece ser que la tendencia descendente de la producción de opio a nivel mundial en el periodo de 2007 a 2009 se mantendrá en 2010. Los primeros datos de 2010 (según el informe de la UNODC *Evaluación rápida de la producción invernal de opio en el Afganistán*) indican que, en general la superficie dedicada al cultivo de opio en el Afganistán podría mantenerse estable, si bien su rendimiento probablemente disminuya debido a una plaga.

Las incautaciones de opio y de heroína siguieron aumentando en 2008. Sin embargo, las de morfina, continuaron su tendencia descendente comenzada en 2007. Aunque las incautaciones de heroína han mostrado una tendencia general ascendente desde 2002, ese aumento ha sido superado por el de las incautaciones de opio a nivel mundial, lo que refleja probablemente las dificultades de operadores de laboratorio en el Afganistán para obtener precursores suficientes para transformar grandes cantidades del opio cosechado en heroína. La mayor parte de las incautaciones de opio siguen teniendo lugar en la República Islámica del Irán, limítrofe con el Afganistán. Así pues, el aumento de las incautaciones de opio a nivel mundial refleja en gran medida el creciente número de incautaciones practicadas por las autoridades de la República Islámica del Irán.

Los dos mercados más grandes del mundo para los opiáceos del Afganistán son la Federación de Rusia y Europa occidental, en los que se consume, en conjunto, casi la mitad de la heroína producida en el mundo. Se calcula que en 2008 se consumieron unas 340 toneladas métricas de heroína a nivel mundial. Para atender esa demanda, teniendo en cuenta las incautaciones practicadas, tuvieron que producirse unas 430 toneladas métricas. Según estimaciones de la UNODC, cerca de 380 toneladas métricas correspondieron ese año a opio afgano, que satisfizo la mayor parte de la demanda mundial.

El mercado más grande de heroína: Europa occidental

El mercado más grande de heroína en el mundo es Europa occidental, y aproximadamente la mitad corresponde tan solo a tres países, a saber, el Reino Unido, Italia y Francia. El consumo de heroína parece estar disminuyendo en la mayoría de los países de Europa occidental, aunque los daños causados por ese consumo aparentemente están aumentando como refleja el número de muertes a causa de la heroína.

La mayor parte de la heroína enviada desde el Afganistán a Europa occidental se transporta por vía terrestre a lo largo de la ruta de los Balcanes, a través de la República Islámica del Irán (o desde el Pakistán hasta la República Islámica del Irán), Turquía y los países de Europa

Tráfico a través del Pakistán

Alrededor de 150 toneladas métricas de heroína o morfina afgana (40%) es traficada al Pakistán, en particular a la provincia de Baluchistán y las Zonas Tribales de Administración Federal, que comparten un largo tramo de frontera con el Afganistán. Si bien parte de la droga es consumida o incautada en el Pakistán, la mayoría s

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Asia sudoriental, alternativos en la producción de MDMA, y de drogas de sustitución, en particular la piperazinas, para imitar los efectos de la MDMA. Algunos de esos productos de sustitución no están sujetos a fiscalización internacional ni reglamentados en todas las jurisdicciones.

Otra droga no sujeta a fiscalización internacional que cuenta con creciente popularidad en Asia es la ketamina, un anestésico para fines veterinarios. La mayor parte de esta droga se desvía de fuentes lícitas, aunque en Asia se ha detectado su fabricación ilícita en gran escala. El volumen de las incautaciones realizadas ha llegado a cientos de kilogramos y el precio se ha mantenido bajo con respecto al de otras drogas.

Cannabis

En contraste con los principales mercados internacionales ya mencionados, muy poco puede decirse sobre la evolución del mercado del cannabis a nivel mundial, puesto que esa droga se produce a nivel local y su consumo está muy extendido en todo el mundo. Los mercados de resina de cannabis están más concentrados que los de la hierba de cannabis, y el Afganistán y Marruecos son los principales exportadores a nivel internacional. La superficie dedicada al cultivo de cannabis en Marruecos se redujo de 134.000 hectáreas en 2003 a 72.500 hectáreas en 2005, y la producción disminuyó de 3.070 a 1.067 toneladas métricas. Desde 2005, la UNODC no ha realizado ningún estudio sobre el cannabis en Marruecos. No obstante, el Gobierno de Marruecos ha comunicado disminuciones desde 2005. Los datos sobre las incautaciones de resina de cannabis producida en Marruecos que han comunicado los países de destino no indican una tendencia a la baja, y al parecer Marruecos sigue siendo uno de las principales fuentes de resina. Se ha calculado que la producción afgana en 2009 fue de 1.500 a 3.500 toneladas métricas (y que la superficie dedicada al cultivo de cannabis osciló entre 10.000 y 24.000 hectáreas). Las incautaciones de resina de cannabis en el Cercano Oriente, en el Oriente Medio y en Asia sudoccidental se duplicaron con creces después de 2006.

La tendencia mundial más significativa de la producción de cannabis en los últimos años ha correspondido al aumento de los cultivos en interiores, en particular en Europa, Australia y América del Norte. El cultivo en interiores es un negocio muy lucrativo y constituye una creciente fuente de ingresos para los grupos de delincuencia organizada a nivel local.

Las incautaciones de hierba y resina de cannabis alcanzaron niveles sin precedentes en 2008. La hierba de cannabis es la de mayor prevalencia, y el volumen total incautado en 2008 fue de 6.587 toneladas métricas, mientras que el de las incautaciones de resina de cannabis fue de 1.637 toneladas métricas. El aumento de las incautaciones de hierba de cannabis parece ser mayor en América del Sur, en particular en el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. En cuanto a la resina, el mayor aumento se concentra en Asia sudoccidental. En junio de 2008 las autoridades afganas se incautaron 236,8 toneladas métricas de resina de cannabis en la provincia de Kandahar, lo que probablemente constituyó el mayor volumen de droga que se haya incautado de una sola vez en toda la historia.

Los precios de la hierba de cannabis varían notablemente entre países y regiones, incluso a los efectos de la paridad del poder adquisitivo. Algunas regiones mostraron internamente niveles de

precios parejos, aunque las comparaciones entre países deberían tomarse con cuidado, puesto que los precios pueden corresponder a tipos de productos diferentes. El Japón, Singapur y dos territorios de Asia oriental (Hong Kong y Macao, (China)) comunicaron precios al por menor muy altos. El alto precio en el Japón puede obedecer a que la mayor parte de la hierba de cannabis se importa, al contrario de lo que sucede por lo general en la mayoría de los otros países. Los precios de la hierba de cannabis en Europa fueron también relativamente altos. En el extremo inferior de la escala de precios se hallaban principalmente países de África, América del Sur y Asia oriental, sudoriental y meridional.

El cannabis sigue siendo la sustancia ilícita más consumida en el mundo. A nivel mundial, se calcula que el número de personas que la habían consumido al menos una vez en 2008 osciló entre 129 millones y 191 millones, es decir, del 2,9% al 4,3% de la población mundial de 15 a 64 años de edad. El consumo de cannabis parece estar en declive a largo plazo en algunos de sus mercados más importantes, en particular América del Norte y algunas partes de Europa occidental. Se ha informado de un consumo cada vez mayor en América del Sur, aunque la prevalencia anual sigue siendo muy inferior a la de América del Norte. Aunque se carece de datos científicamente válidos sobre el consumo de cannabis tanto en África como en Asia, los expertos nacionales de ambos continentes observan una tendencia al alza.

El tráfico de drogas y la inestabilidad en los países de tránsito

El tráfico de drogas puede plantear una amenaza para la estabilidad política bajo dos circunstancias. La primera se da en países en que insurgentes y grupos armados ilegales obtienen fondos a partir del control de la producción y el tráfico de drogas y de los impuestos que cobran por ambos. La segunda se refiere a países que no viven semejante situación, pero en los que los traficantes de drogas adquieren poder suficiente para desafiar al Estado mediante la confrontación violenta o la corrupción a alto nivel. El presente capítulo se centra en este segundo caso, y en él se examinan las repercusiones que tiene el tráfico de cocaína en los países de tránsito.

Entre 2006 y 2008, más de la mitad de los envíos de cocaína por vía marítima con destino a Europa que fueron detectados procedía de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. El Ecuador también se ha visto afectado por el aumento del tráfico de tránsito, y ambos países experimentan crecientes problemas de violencia.

El declive del mercado de la cocaína en los Estados Unidos y el auge de Europa han contribuido también al auge de la violencia en la región del Caribe. En algunos casos, ello obedece a la existencia de nuevas corrientes de tráfico de cocaína, y en otros, a la disminución de los ingresos derivados del tráfico de cocaína que obtienen los delincuentes locales. Al parecer, cualquier cambio drástico en el tráfico puede tener un efecto desestabilizador y generar violencia.

La región más afectada hoy en día es el Triángulo Norte de América Central: Guatemala, Honduras y El Salvador. En ella, la intensa violencia generada por las drogas ha planteado un grave problema para la gobernanza. Aunque esos países ya han vivido problemas de violencia, la tasa de homicidios es mayor no en las principales zonas urbanas, sino en las zonas del país

particularmente castigadas por el tráfico de drogas, incluidos algunos puertos y determinadas zonas fronterizas.

Aunque se ha hablado mucho de la violencia relacionada con el tráfico de drogas en México, las

perception that supporting any change in our punitive drug policies is politically risky persists today. As Senator Jim Webb, who recently called for a national commission to reassess criminal justice policy, put it, few candidates or elected officials these days even dare to mention the mind-boggling inconsistencies and the long-term problems that are inherent in [our criminal justice system] because they believe that to be viewed as 'soft on crime' is one of the surest career-killers in American politics.⁶

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, public opinion polls and election results reveal that there has been a dramatic – though largely unnoticed – shift in support of drug policy reform among voters over the past decade. Today, a full three quarters of Americans say that they think our war on drugs policy is failing, according to a 2008 Zogby poll.⁷ Similarly, ballot initiatives to reform state drug policies have met with resounding success, beginning with California's medical marijuana initiative in 1996. Since that time, a total of 13 states have adopted medical marijuana laws, the most recent being Michigan, where the measure passed with 63% of the vote. And the trend extends beyond medical marijuana. In 2000, for example, California voters passed Proposition 36, which diverts many first- and second-time drug offenders to treatment instead of incarceration. In November 2008 in Massachusetts, Bay Staters voted by 65% to decriminalize marijuana. To be sure, support for the more controversial measures advocated by some drug policy reform advocates remains low. However, a substantial and growing majority of voters today favor

findings revealed countries with more stringent policies toward illegal drug use did not have lower levels of such use than countries with more liberal policies. ¹¹

money toward successful treatment and prevention measures. Studies have consistently shown drug treatment and prevention programs to be more cost effective than interdiction, incarceration, and eradication programs. For example, a detailed study conducted by the RAND Corporation at the request of the ONDCP compared treatment with other strategies in the context of cocaine. The study found that each cocaine-control dollar used for treatment generates societal cost savings of \$7.48, compared to savings of only 15 cents for every dollar used for source-country control, 32 cents for every dollar used for interdiction, and 52 cents for every dollar used for domestic law enforcement.¹⁵ Yet, only 35% of the National Drug Control Policy budget goes toward treatment and prevention initiatives (a figure that includes treatment and prevention-related research) while 65% is put to supply-reduction measures, including domestic law enforcement, interdiction, and international programs.¹⁶

substantially reduced costs. As the 2009 National Drug Control Strategy explained, a decade of drug court research shows that [drug] courts work better than jail or prison[.]²⁰ An analysis in California, for example, found that the drug courts studied cost only \$3,000 on average per client while generating an average savings of \$11,000 per client in reductions in recidivism and costs to victims.²¹ Despite broad agreement that drug courts are successful, however, a 2008 study by the Urban Institute determined that just 50% of those currently eligible for drug courts, and a mere 3.8% of all at-risk arrestees, are able to participate in a drug court program. The researchers estimated that if treatment were provided to all at-risk arrestees, it would produce a net benefit of approximately \$32 billion.²² Increasing funding to the grant program, particularly to courts that do not have overly restrictive eligibility requirements, would help existing courts serve all eligible offenders and encourage states to create additional programs.

Finally, the federal government should provide additional funding for innovative medical-based prevention programs like the Bush Administration's successful Screening, Brief Intervention, and Referral to Treatment (SBIRT) initiative. The federal government began funding screening programs through SBIRT in 2003 and the early results are encouraging.²³ The programs incorporate drug and alcohol addiction screening and counseling into general medical settings, such as visits to primary care providers. This method takes advantage of the fact that many individuals who have a drug abuse problem or are at risk of developing one do not proactively seek substance abuse treatment but will nevertheless continue to visit primary care physicians for routine examinations. SBIRT provides funding to develop and implement programs that aim to make drug screening and treatment referrals part of standard medical practice. The programs represent a common sense public health approach to substance abuse and have the potential to both help prevent problem use from becoming full-blown addiction through interventions and effectively facilitate treatment for those who are addicted.

To free up funds for additional expenditures on demand reduction programs, the ONDCP should reduce or eliminate funding for some of the drug war programs that have proven to be particularly ineffective. Source-country crop eradication programs like Plan Colombia, federal criminal investigation and prosecution of low- and mid-level drug offenders, and student drug testing grants are examples of programs that should be targeted for cuts. Eradication programs are a particularly stark example of the failure of our supply-side-oriented war on drugs strategy. These programs aim to reduce the supply of drugs like cocaine and heroin in the United States by wiping out coca and poppy crops in source countries, primarily through aerial fumigation. The strategy is incredibly expensive but does little to reduce drug supply. Among the reasons that crop eradication programs have not succeeded is that production simply shifts from the targeted region to a new one. At the same time, the herbicides used to spray coca and poppy fields also damage the legal crops of local subsistence farmers and may have negative environmental and health effects. A 2008 Government Accountability Office report on Plan Colombia, which featured perhaps the most prominent and expansive eradication effort to date, found that coca

²⁰ OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2009).

²¹ OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2008).

²² AVINASH SINGH BHATI ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, TO

cultivation in Colombia had actually *increased* by 15% since 2000.²⁴ During the same period, the United States provided over \$6 billion in support to Plan Colombia, though some of these funds were put toward uses other than crop eradication. Expenditures on foreign aerial fumigation programs should be dramatically reduced, if not eliminated.

In terms of domestic programs, the ONDCP, in coordination with the Department of Justice and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), should work to significantly reduce the number of federal drug prosecutions. Despite overwhelming evidence that mass incarceration of drug offenders has done little to reduce drug use or availability, drug offenses remain among the most frequently prosecuted offense category and comprised approximately 35% of all federal felony and Class A misdemeanor cases in 2007.²⁵ Although there is no current data regarding how many drug prosecutions overall are of low- and mid-level players – such as couriers, street dealers, or look-outs – a 2007 United States Sentencing Commission report on crack and powder cocaine sentencing revealed that 61.5% of crack cocaine offenders and 53.1% of power cocaine offenders fall into these categories.²⁶ Outside of a limited category of cases where, for example, federal prosecution of an underling is truly necessary to reach a kingpin or dismantle a large-scale criminal organization, there is no reason why most offenders in these categories should be the subject of federal law enforcement resources. However, a 2004 study of predictive factors on federal decisions about which cases to prosecute found that drug prosecutions are the least likely of all federal crimes to be declined for prosecution.²⁷ Domestic federal drug investigations and prosecutions, and the lengthy sentences they entail, should be reserved for high-level drug offenders. In addition to saving money, scaling back federal prosecutions of drug couriers and street dealers would be a much-needed first step toward addressing our embarrassingly high incarceration rate, and one that could be achieved without changing federal drug laws.

While supply-side programs should be the primary targets for cuts, the Obama Administration should also carefully review prevention spending and reduce or eliminate funding for ideologically driven programs that have not achieved results. The chief example in this area is

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entirely³². At a minimum, however, the Obama Administration should work with Congress to amend the mandatory minimum drug sentencing provisions in Title 21 of the United States Code to exclude low- and mid-level offenders from their reach. Specifically, mandatory minimum sentences based on drug quantity should not apply to offenders whose role is limited to that of a drug courier, street-level dealer, or peripheral player (such as those whose role is limited to provid

children from dangerous psychoactive drugs.³⁶ Under the Bush Administration, federal anti-medical marijuana efforts reached a new height, with the DEA routinely conducting armed raids of medical marijuana hospices in California.

Attorney General Eric Holder recently announced that the new administration would end the medical marijuana raids in accordance with statements President Obama made during his campaign.³⁷ Ending the DEA's raids is an important and necessary step that will allow states to implement their medical marijuana laws without undue federal interference. It is, however, only

particular emphasis on programs that provide other services such as substance abuse treatment. Federal needle exchange funding would be a cost-effective method for reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS and, by coupling the funding with support for substance abuse treatment services, could also help to reduce addiction rates. Indeed, early studies have indicated that needle exchange programs that have integrated treatment services may decrease intravenous drug use.

D. Repeal the Higher Education Act Drug Provision

In 1998, Representative Mark Souder added an amendment to the Higher Education Act reauthorization bill to strip federal financial aid from students if they are convicted of any drug offense, including simple possession. Since then, nearly 200,000 students have been denied federal financial aid under what has become known as the HEA Drug Provision. This law, while relatively limited in scope, is emblematic of some of the more bewildering legislation that has been enacted, and remains in place today, because of the dominance of the get tough ideology of the war on drugs. Indeed, while the law singles out drug offenses for removal of financial aid, all other criminal offenders – including rapists and murderers – remain eligible to receive federal financial aid.

Putting roadblocks on the path to education for students who are at risk of abusing drugs is counterproductive to the goal of reducing drug abuse. Students who are forced to drop out of school because they cannot receive financial aid are more likely to continue using or abusing drugs and less likely to become productive members of society. Furthermore, because students from wealthy families can afford college without financial aid, the law has a disproportionate impact on students from low- and middle-income families. Finally, because students must maintain good academic standing to receive aid in the first place, the HEA Drug Provision only affects people who are working hard and doing well in school.

In 2006, in response to growing support for repealing the HEA Drug Provision, Congress scaled back the law so that it does not apply to students who are convicted of a drug offense before they begin college. However, students who are convicted of a drug offense during college are still ineligible for aid. In 2008, Representative Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd each introduced bills to repeal the financial aid elimination penalty. The Obama Administration should support repealing the HEA Drug Provision and work to ensure passage of repeal legislation the next time it is introduced. Repealing this law would not only help to keep thousands of at-risk students on the path toward an education and a productive life, it would send a strong signal that the era of judging drug policies based on how tough they are rather than how effective they are is coming to an end.

Conclusion

re-orienting our federal drug strategy. None of these proposals is groundbreaking – indeed, most have been the subject of debate for some time – but together they can point the way toward a new and more effective approach to dealing with the problem of drug abuse.

Finally, while the proposals discussed in this paper will result in dramatic improvements, in the long term more substantial change will be required. The recent explosion in drug cartel violence at the Mexican border, which is reminiscent of the days of Al Capone during alcohol prohibition, serves as a stark reminder of the depths of the problems that remain after our 40-year war on drugs. Thus, perhaps more than any specific policy reform, the most important action President Obama can take would be to follow the Brookings Institute's recommendation and form a commission to conduct a comprehensive reevaluation of our drug policies in light of the evidence from our own experiences, as well of the experiences in other countries over the past four decades.

discretionary access to the public purse for large-scale vote-buying, the power to weaken the judiciary and legislatures to keep potential competitors out, and the use of information technology and coercion to threaten voters and activists. He adds that country income levels, the presence of valuable natural resources, and complex ethnicity politics tend to exacerbate the potential for abuse.

Daniel Posner and Daniel Young further explain that, although since the nineties elected African presidents have seemed more amenable to accepting limits, those who seek a third term or even indefinite re-election remain common.⁴ In such cases—and there are many—only incumbents faced with divisions in the ruling party and citizen action have lost, such as Frederick Chiluba in Zambia, Bakili Muluzi in Malawi, and Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria. Several others were successful, however, including Idriss Déby in Chad, Omar Bongo in Gabon, Lansana Conté in Guinea, Samuel Nujoma in Namibia, Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo, and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda—all thanks to ironclad control of legislatures, high approval ratings and the ability to buy votes on a national scale.

While the data about the issue in Latin America are scarce, indicators point in the same direction. Adam Przeworski and Carolina Curvale's study of first and additional re-elections based on a historical series starting in the mid-19th century found that only two incumbents ever lost an election: Hipólito Mejía (Dominican Republic, 2004) and Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua, 1990).⁵ Javier Corrales sees incumbent re-election as part of the impact of former and outsider presidents who set out to radically change the prevailing system.⁶ Such presidents have

sobriquet that refers to the intensive use of the mass media to build the presidential image without the filter of partisan middlemen. The use of participatory mechanisms such as grass-roots organizations and community councils that are called into action directly from the telepresidential screen illustrates just how important this development is. The new style stands in stark contrast to traditional partisanship and clientelism and opens up a symbolic new space where the president stands as the one political actor who—directly and alone—represents the interests of the people, often complemented by narrowly-targeted social policies and cash transfers.

This tendency is key to understanding the informal power of such presidents and their positive approval ratings in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In Colombia, which has stood far apart from the revolutionary experiences of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the new style is fundamental to understanding former president Uribe's popularity, which far exceeded the accomplishments of his democratic security policy. Ideological differences aside, in style he closely resembled Chávez and Morales, both presidents who set out to radically transform their societies.

A very different trend prevails in Peru. Given his personal history, Alan García could well have been expected to again try his hand at neo-populism, this time without sacrificing the successful economic reforms of previous decades. Yet he adopted a more conventional style of working with other branches of government, including at the municipal and regional level. It is hard to tell whether the change stems from political restrictions or self-restraint intended to help democratic institutions consolidate. What we do know is that García has the lowest approval ratings in the region—perhaps as a result of not adopting the new style favored by his Andean peers. Surely, this does not guarantee that his successors may not try to insert the style into their governance—as Fujimori did—

and the possibility of making such changes while still upholding power sharing and democratic rule. While most reform promoters will argue that continuity is required to guarantee change, the risk of incumbent re-election is that it may instead encourage authoritarianism within electoral democracies. In essence, the debate is about short- vs. long-term consequences— about the choice between radical or gradual reform. While radical reforms may require a short-term dose of presidential strength, the long-term consequences may be highly negative unless the need to place limits on such strength by restoring the balance of power is accepted. Gradual reform, while inherently slower because of the need for negotiation and compromise, may find many hurdles on the way to effective implementation but will guarantee a better balance of power— even as it runs the risk of never being adopted. If the Andean region is to ensure the coexistence of electoral democracy, democratic rule, and power sharing, it will inevitably have to learn how to balance these risks.

“The State of Democracy in the Andes: Introduction to a thematic issue of Revista de Ciencia Política”

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Abstract

This overview finds evidence for concern about the ability of the governments in Colombia and Venezuela to hold free and fair elections and a trend toward the concentration of executive power in most countries in the sub-region. The separation of powers has been most sharply eroded in Venezuela; but Bolivia and Ecuador are moving in a similar direction. Colombia has a robust constitutional order, including a remarkably independent judiciary, however, constitutional order is threatened by the growing concentration of executive power. At the same time, most Andean countries are experimenting with new mechanisms of participation. There are sharp contrasts between the model of participation in Bolivia and Venezuela, two countries often lumped together by observers; and, despite ideological differences, striking similarities in the presidential styles of Presidents Uribe and Chávez. Among Andean nations, only Chile is not undergoing a revolution in participation. Finally, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have rewritten their constitutions in an attempt to encourage the exercise of constituent power. These cases exhibit variation in terms of the degree to which deliberative, pluralistic, lawful, and constitutional procedures were used.

I. Introduction

The articles in this special issue form part of a project to assess the state of democracy in the Andean region undertaken by the Andean Democracy Research Network. We began with a simple premise: that democracy can be analyzed and evaluated at three distinct levels. First, it is widely accepted that elections are an essential feature of democracy. We therefore place electoral democracy, or polyarchy, at the centre of our analysis.¹ Yet we also recognize that polyarchy omits (quite deliberately) a set of constitutional features of modern political systems that turn out to be problematic in many newer democracies: the independence of the judiciary, the degree of civilian control over the armed forces, the extent to which the executive abides by the rule of law, and the productivity of the legislature. Finally, we also recognize that democracy is not meaningful unless it offers the citizens mechanisms by which to influence the decisions that directly affect their lives. In other words, democracy is about more than voting and rights, it is also about citizenship and participation. In line with this thinking, we developed a Decalogue. We asked researchers in six countries to analyze the state of democracy according to the following criteria:²

¹ Dahl (1971) and Przeworski (1991).

² The findings reported in this overview article encompass both the reports published in this thematic issue of the *Revista de Ciencia Política*, as well as those that will appear in separate publications. They include Gómez Calcaño, Luis, et al. "Venezuela: Democracia en crisis"; Bejarano, Ana María & Helena Alviar, "Colombia: La dimensión constitucional de la democracia"; David Altman and Juan Pablo Luna, "Chile ¿Institucionalización con pies de barro?"; Toranzo Roca, Carlos, Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé & Carlos Romero, "Bolivia: Diagnóstico de la democracia boliviana"; Roncagliolo, Rafael et al, "Peru: Ejercicio de la representación y la participación política"; Miguel Arnulfo Ruiz Acosta, "Democracia, proceso constituyente y nueva Constitución en el Ecuador contemporáneo". A number of these publications will appear in a forthcoming book to be published

Electoral Democracy

1. The right to vote is respected
2. Elections are clean
3. Elections are free
4. Public officials are elected and allowed to govern³ Constitutional Democracy⁴
5. Executive and legislative branches of government are independent
6. The judiciary is independent from the executive and legislature⁵
- 7.

actions of these offices because their incumbents can be removed at will by a pliant legislature. The initiative in the most important areas of legislation (including major constitutional reform proposals) has come from the executive, with the legislature acting like a virtual rubber stamp

most dramatic recent example was the conflict between President Correa and the congress over the decision by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, to call for a "popular consultation" to convene a constituent assembly. When the congress rejected this decision, removed the head of the TSE, and ordered the trial of the members of the TSE who supported the decision, the TSE replied by removing the 57 deputies who had attempted to sack them. With the majority of members of congress in the hands of alternates, the government was able to get its way. The TC tried to support the suspended legislators, but the new congressional majority removed the judges of the TC on grounds considered arbitrary and unconstitutional.

Conflicts between legislature and executive have politicized the judiciary, and judges have become political agents. The new constitution creates a supreme court that is weaker and less autonomous, and a very powerful constitutional court, with few mechanisms of accountability. The new Constitutional Court is a key element in the new political system. It can override the supreme court. Its concurrence is necessary for the president to dissolve the legislature, or for the legislature to impeach the president. Its support must also be secured before any legislative initiative of citizens, or any popular consultation. Yet the Constitutional Court cannot be held accountable - there is no political justice for its members. The new constitution also creates a more powerful executive, one with extensive executive prerogatives and legislative powers. The president can initiate legislation in urgent economic matters, veto legislation, and propose alternative laws that can only be defeated by a super-majority. Agents of horizontal accountability are placed outside the control of the legislature, reinforcing the executive.

The similarities and differences between Colombia and the other Andean nations are instructive. President Uribe has sought to concentrate executive power, but he is operating in an institutional environment with a more robust constitutional separation of powers. Uribe is an outsider. He ran as an independent in both the 2002 and 2006 elections, and has governed with a heterogeneous and fragile coalition, but one that has nonetheless afforded his government a legislative majority. The biggest threat to his majority is the fact that 73 members of congress are under investigation as a consequence of the *parapolitica* scandal, and 30 have been sentenced and imprisoned (see Botero, Hoskin and Pachón). Many of those implicated in the scandal are from the government coalition. Some lawmakers have resigned their seats rather than be investigated by the constitutional court. They believe they have a better chance if they are tried in common courts (moreover, they always have the possibility of appeal).

A political reform to address the *parapolitica* scandal sank when it became clear that any sanctions imposed on parties for involvement with paramilitaries would result in the loss of the government's majority. The executive has strong legislative and other powers, including: procedural and substantive veto; broad powers to declare a state of siege; the ability to prioritize a bill through an urgency petition; and areas of exclusive rights to legislate (regarding ministries, public sector salaries, budget, trade, tariffs, debt). The executive also has extensive powers of appointment and nomination. The 1991 Constitution imposed a strict "no-re-election" term limit, which was changed in 2005 to enable Uribe to be re-elected, without other measures being taken to ensure the balance among branches of government from being altered. Critics of re-election suggested that the longer presidential term created the threat that the executive would be able to exert his administrative and appointment powers to pack the courts, control other agencies of horizontal accountability, and influence the central bank. Had Uribe been allowed to run for a

third term, this would have further increase presidential powers. However, in a landmark decision in February 2010, Colombia's constitutional court voted 7-2 against a referendum to allow Uribe to run for a third term, largely on the grounds that another term would weaken checks and balances in Colombia's democracy.

The biggest difference between Colombia and most of its Andean neighbors is that it has a remarkably independent and energetic judiciary. Uribe has tried to rein it in, and he has also tried to turn public opinion against the judiciary, but so far has failed. Had he been allowed to run for re-election, he would have been able to continue to extend his influence over the court system. The Constitution of 1991 strengthened the powers of the judiciary, and created new judicial bodies (including a constitutional court), reorganized its functions and competencies, and created new instruments to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. It provided the judiciary with a legal figure known as "*acciones de tutela*," (injunctions) which are sweeping powers to protect rights. Injunctions are initiated by citizens to demand justice from the courts. Judges can issue injunctions against other citizens (including government officials) in defense of rights on penalty of incarceration. As a result, the courts have an important role in setting the legislative agenda, as congress must provide appropriations to ensure compliance with injunctions. Citizens can take their injunctions to congress and demand their rights be upheld. As a result, citizens increasingly turn to the courts before lobbying parties (this is also because parties have tended not to be as effective in protecting rights).

The executive has challenged the powers of the judiciary, especially by seeking to debilitate the constitutional court as a final interpreter of the constitution (on the grounds that this makes it a legislator). The executive seeks to reduce the *acciones de tutela*, and weaken judicial control over exceptional measures. At the administrative level, the executive has acquired greater influence over the supreme court. For example, he has appointed all the magistrates in its disciplinary chamber. Uribe has had frequent altercations with the supreme court, especially regarding investigations into the *parapolitica* scandal. The executive has repeatedly submitted counter-reform measures to weaken the sweeping powers of the judiciary that were written into the 1991 Constitution in a deliberate effort to check executive power. Another disturbing feature of Colombian democracy is the tendency to respond to protests with repression or to criminalize dissent, a pattern observed in virtually all the other Andean cases to some degree as well.

IV. From Crisis of Representation to Participation Revolution

In an attempt to address the growing concern with inclusive citizenship that has animated many of the most important democratic innovations in the region in recent years, the methodological template encouraged researchers to assess civil, political, and social, economic and cultural rights. In the course of our research we recognized the importance of focusing on models of participation, in addition to rights of citizenship, and we amended our Decalogue accordingly.

In the contemporary Andean context we witness the proliferation of new mechanisms of more direct participation. Rafael Roncagliolo and his collaborators have documented a wide range of forms that direct democracy can take which include, inter alia, referenda (citizen or government

municipal level. The Law of Agrarian Reform grants the right of collective ownership of land. The Law of Environment gives indigenous communities management of biodiversity, while the forest law places agrarian rights above the right to log, and the hydrocarbon law gives indigenous control over oil and gas in their territories. 12,000 communities have been granted legal personality, and indigenous people are granted representation in all legislatures and the executive. Thousands of indigenous communities have benefited, as well as communal peasant and smallholdings.⁹

Ecuador's new constitution adopted participatory mechanisms including legislative initiative, popular consultations, and recall. These are not all entirely new. There have been popular consultations since 1967, and legislative initiative and recall have been enshrined in law (but never used) since 1978. The new constitution creates an "empty seat" in local governments to be occupied by civil society stakeholders. It encourages participatory budgeting and open assemblies (*cabildos abiertos*). In the new constitution, mechanisms of direct participation are given a more central place: it is easier for citizens to initiate legislation, and it is easier to initiate referenda, but the initiative must be accepted by the constitutional court.

Since 1980, Peru has progressively adopted more mechanisms of direct participation. The first step was decentr

process is truly deliberative, plural, and legitimate in terms of basic legal and constitutional principles. A brief comparison of the constituent assemblies in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia exposes major differences that may well, in turn, influence the legitimacy of the emerging constitutional order. Whereas the opposition has played little or no role in the construction of a new constitutional order in Venezuela, it played a significant role in Bolivia. Ecuador represents an intermediate case.

Chávez's allies overwhelmingly controlled the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly of 1999. The sitting congress was closed, its powers usurped. Although the new constitution was radically different from the 1961 Constitution, the process of constitutional change was used to concentrate executive power and to bring the judiciary and other government agencies under the control of the executive. Although the constitution was initially rejected by much of the opposition, factions of which attempted to remove Chávez by non-constitutional means in April 2002, it has been tacitly accepted by all parties since then. It is far from clear whether this is due to conviction or convenience, however, for is it clear whether the Bolivarian Constitution would survive Chávez's departure from office. This uncertainty motivated the push for indefinite presidential re-election. The idea of constituent power has taken on a life of its own in Venezuela. For the Chavez government, the doctrine of constituent power implies a process that has been expanded, extended, and remains ongoing. Indeed, it has been extended to the micro-level through Communal Councils (discussed above). A second constitutional reform by referendum was attempted (unsuccessfully) in 2007; this was followed by a referendum on term limits in 2009 that passed. As Penfold notes, the elimination of term limits substantially increases executive power.

Bolivia's constituent assembly was elected to change the constitution, but significantly the government did not have the 2/3rds majority to pass a constitution made to measure. The electoral system used to select the Constituent Assembly virtually guaranteed that the government would not have the necessary super-majority to change the constitution unilaterally. There were 5 members for each of 9 department (45 in total), and then three representatives in 70 districts (total of 210). The top vote winner would take the first seat, and the runner-up would get the second. The third seat would go to the first party if it had over 50% of the vote. This made it almost mathematically impossible for any party to win 2/3rds of the seats. Yet the "Ley Especial de Convocatoria" expressly required a 2/3rds majority.

The constituent assembly did not usurp the powers of congress. Within the constituent assembly, there were important flaws in the deliberative process. Much time was spent arguing over procedural rules not substance. When agreement could not be reached with the opposition, the text was approved by pro-government members only (under military protection). Nevertheless, the presence of a sitting congress, under immense pressure from Bolivia's social movements, helped resolve the impasse. The text was submitted to congress, which modified many of its articles, thereby ensuring input from opposition, before it was submitted to a referendum. With the 2009 referendum, the text became law.

In Ecuador, a constituent assembly rewrote the constitution and submitted it to a referendum. The constituent assembly was composed of 24 national representatives, 100 from the provinces, 6 representing migrants. The election process was conducted without irregularities. The

between the presidential style of Chávez and Uribe, and yet Uribe operates in a context of greater constitutional constraints. There are notable similarities in the ways that leaders in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia have responded to failures of representation by promoting more participation, and yet both the process and outcome of constitutional reforms have also diverged.

One implication of our studies is that it is overly-simplistic to suggest that there are two clusters of democracy in the Andes: the precarious democracies where radical populists have come to power and are acting at the margins of the constitutional order, such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, and the more robust and stable democracies in which responsible governments are pursuing market-friendly policies within the framework of constitutional institutions (Chile, Colombia, and Peru).¹³ Taken as a set, the studies here provide the foundations for a much more nuanced (if difficult to quantify) characterization. Chile's democracy shows real strengths in terms of constitutional order and the rule of law, but it is sorely deficient in terms of participation. The leaders of Venezuela and Colombia share little in terms of ideology, Tm6 0 0 1 153.26 584.9

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“The Fate of Democracy and Multilateralism in the Americas”

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The election of Barack Obama has raised enormous expectations around the world, including in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). While President Obama’s attention has understandably been focused predominantly on formidable challenges at home, in the Middle East, and in Asia during his first year in office, there are three reasons why intra-hemispheric relations are increasingly of crucial importance:

1. The social discontent in LAC, the region with the world’s greatest disparity in the distribution of wealth and incomes, threatens many of our citizens’ faith in democracy. Anger and dissatisfaction with the status quo are empowering politicians who are recycling dangerous populist formulas that place leaders above institutions. In the streets of LAC, one can hear the sound of 200 million poor and excluded women and men who were unable to taste the economic fruits of prosperity prior to the global financial meltdown. They are demanding a job with a decent salary, access to potable water and

Latin American and Caribbean States, launched in Playa del Carmen, Mexico, just at the end of February, is the latest attempt to redraft the region's international relations.

The frequent creation of new institutions suggests that our region's long-established, multi-lateral political body, the Organization of American States (OAS) (which includes the United States and Canada), must work harder to avoid becoming redundant. The Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted in Lima, Peru, during the 2001 General Assembly of the OAS, is binding on the 35 member states. The Charter warns that illiteracy and low levels of human development are factors that have negative repercussions on not only our economies, but also on the consolidation of democracy. Thus, the signatory governments recognized that the elimination of extreme poverty is key to the preservation of democratic order; this crucial task is the common and shared responsibility of the American States. Our leaders and multilateral institutions must take action and deliver results to prevent this democratic Charter from becoming little more than a collection of dead words.

The OAS, *which belongs to all of the citizens of the Americas*, has the enormous challenge of contributing in a significant, clear, and measurable manner to the strengthening of democratic institutions, to ensure that they be independent, participatory, transparent, resistant to manipulation, and that they provide a space of downward accountability – from elected officials toward those whom they govern.

In short, our American States need a new, shared and explicit social agenda for democracy. We must go beyond the extraction of raw materials and invest intelligently in the gray matter of our people, which is necessary to compete with other regions in today's knowledge economies. In achieving these goals, we must also bear in mind that we carry a great responsibility to protect the environment for the sake of our children and our children's children.

In few times in its history has LAC had such an enormous potential to become a promising region with a leading role in the global economy and the world community of democracies, as it now has in the next 10 to 15 years. To ensure that this opportunity is not lost, together we must build a concerted Social Agenda that promotes sustained economic growth with distribution (because we cannot redistribute poverty), as well as a social inclusion that respects our cultural diversity and strengthens the sustainability of healthy political systems.

to file complaints and petitions through mobile-phone text messaging to a fre

We seek an Agenda of commitment, mutual cooperation, and measurable results that go beyond – yet do not overlook – our obvious common interests concerning security, the fight against drug trafficking, free-trade treaties, and the Cuba issue. The future demands new inter-hemispheric relations that prioritize economic, social, political, and judicial stability, safeguarding our environment, the eradication of poverty, the reduction of inequalities and social exclusion, and the reduction of the digital gap (the Global Center for Development and Democracy has already initiated a Digital Democracy project to incorporate marginalized populations into their countries' political processes).

This new, redefined Agenda is not motivated to attain greater amounts of foreign aid from North America; rather, it seeks a horizontal dialogue on a wider spectrum of issues that are now pertinent to our entire hemisphere.

While a number of the policy recommendations set forth in the *Social Agenda for Democracy* pertain to internal governance issues, the OAS can contribute by encouraging the strengthening of democratic institutions, accountability, respect for the freedom of expression, and human rights in our region.

Together, we must confront our hemisphere's challenges with pragmatism, with the political will to take action, and, as always, with hope.

Editor's Note: Contributions to this article are courtesy of Avi Tuschman, senior writer and international projects adviser for the Global Center for Development and Democracy.